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Releases and updates
Shift's update channel is this repository. There is no update server, no object storage, and no release service to configure: the installers and a small manifest are pushed to a git branch, and a running copy reads that branch over HTTPS.
The channel
An orphan branch named releases holds exactly one release:
releases/
├── shift-update.json
├── shift-update.sig
├── Shift-macOS-universal.dmg
└── Shift-Setup-0.1.1-win-x64.exe
shift-update.json names the version and, per platform, the artifact file, its size in
bytes and its SHA256:
{
"schema": 1,
"version": "0.1.1",
"date": "2026-10-26",
"notes": "",
"artifacts": {
"macos": { "file": "Shift-macOS-universal.dmg", "sha256": "57fc…", "size": 55479751 },
"windows": { "file": "Shift-Setup-0.1.1-win-x64.exe", "sha256": "0255…", "size": 24545040 }
}
}
Supported release targets
Shift ships two installers: macOS (universal) and Windows x64. That is a scope decision, not a code limit, and it decides what the channel may contain:
| Key | Shipped | Notes |
|---|---|---|
macos |
yes | One universal bundle, Apple silicon and Intel |
windows |
yes | x64, which is also what an ARM machine falls back to |
windows-arm64 |
no | Buildable — build-windows-release.sh --arch arm64 still works — just not published |
linux |
no | Build target, not a product; see below |
Publishing an ARM64 Windows build later needs no code change: the ladder already prefers
windows-arm64 and falls back to windows, so adding the file to artifacts/ and
re-publishing is enough.
Keys are platform, then platform and architecture where they differ. A build picks the first key its own architecture matches and never crosses operating systems:
| Running on | Keys tried, in order |
|---|---|
| macOS (Apple silicon or Intel) | macos |
| Windows x64 | windows |
| Windows ARM64 | windows-arm64, then windows |
| Linux | linux |
The ARM64 fallback to windows is deliberate: Windows on ARM runs x64 binaries under
emulation, so a channel that only carries x64 keeps serving ARM machines exactly as it did
before the ARM build existed. artifact_keys_for and select_artifact in
src-tauri/src/update.rs hold that ladder and are tested directly, so the rule is fixed
by a test rather than by a comment.
The branch is rebuilt as a fresh root commit on every publish and force-pushed, so it
never accumulates gigabytes of installer history while main stays clean.
Publishing
pnpm tauri build … # bundles land in artifacts/
printf 'Fixes the ring on external displays.\n' > /tmp/notes.md
scripts/publish-release.sh --notes /tmp/notes.md # hash, commit, push
scripts/publish-release.sh hashes every file in artifacts/, builds the manifest,
writes the tree with git plumbing (update-index → write-tree → commit-tree →
update-ref, through a temporary GIT_INDEX_FILE so the working tree is untouched) and
force-pushes releases. The manifest and the pushed bytes cannot disagree, because the
same Python pass that walks the files produces both.
| Flag | Effect |
|---|---|
--notes FILE |
Release notes shown in the Updates panel |
--key FILE |
Sign the manifest with this ed25519 key (SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY also works) |
--dry-run |
Print the manifest and the tree that would be pushed; write nothing |
--no-push |
Commit locally on releases but leave the remote alone |
--branch NAME |
Publish to another channel instead of releases |
Recognised installers: Shift-macOS-universal.dmg (macOS), Shift-Setup-<version>-win-x64.exe
and Shift-Setup-<version>-win-arm64.exe (Windows, keys windows and windows-arm64),
*.AppImage / *.deb (Linux). Other files in artifacts/ — the portable ZIPs,
SHA256SUMS.txt, the README-Windows-<arch>.txt notes — travel with the branch but are
not offered as installers. Dotfiles and an old manifest are skipped.
Both Windows architectures come from one command, which cross-compiles each target,
checks the PE machine field of the binary it just built (0x8664 for x64, 0xAA64 for
ARM64) so a wrong --target cannot ship an x64 EXE inside an arm64 package, and gates the
installer to the matching machine:
scripts/build-windows-release.sh # both architectures
scripts/build-windows-release.sh --arch arm64 # one of them
scripts/build-windows-release.sh --skip-build # repackage existing EXEs
Signing the channel
Integrity says the download matches the manifest; authenticity says the manifest came
from you. scripts/release-key.py closes that gap with one ed25519 key.
scripts/release-key.py keygen ~/.config/shift-release/release.ed25519
# -> prints the hex public key to bake into the build
export SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY=~/.config/shift-release/release.ed25519
pnpm tauri build --target universal-apple-darwin --bundles app,dmg # macOS
scripts/build-windows-release.sh # both Windows architectures
scripts/publish-release.sh --key "$SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY"
Give the release build SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY (the hex key) and it can verify the feed; give
it SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY (the private key) and build-windows-release.sh derives the public
key from it, so a cross-build can never be packaged with a key that does not match the
signature publish-release.sh --key produces. Without either, the script prints
no release key: this build will report the feed as unsigned rather than letting it pass
for a quieter log.
The signature is detached: shift-update.sig holds base64 over the manifest's exact
bytes, so verification needs no JSON canonicalisation rules and the manifest's formatting
stays free to change. It is fetched from the directory that already holds the manifest, so
a staging feed needs only its own manifest plus signature — a fork never configures a
second URL.
| Build | Feed | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Key baked | signature verifies | update offered, panel says the signature was verified |
| Key baked | signature missing or wrong | check fails with that reason; nothing is offered |
| No key | any | integrity gate only; panel says this build cannot verify a signature |
The key is the one secret in this design. Losing it means publishing a new app build with
a new baked key; leaking it means an attacker can publish anything to the channel, exactly
as leaking push access to releases already does today. Keep it outside the repository —
~/.config/shift-release/ is where the local publishing machine keeps it.
Where a build looks for updates
src-tauri/build.rs derives the feed from the origin remote at build time:
| Remote | Feed URL |
|---|---|
| Gitea / Forgejo | https://host/owner/repo/raw/branch/releases/shift-update.json |
| GitHub | https://github.com/owner/repo/raw/releases/shift-update.json |
| GitLab | https://gitlab.example/owner/repo/-/raw/releases/shift-update.json |
Two overrides exist, and neither needs a rebuild of the frontend:
SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEYat build time bakes in the release key; anything that is not 32 bytes of hex fails the build rather than silently producing an updater that trusts the feed anyway. A key that parses but is not a curve point is a runtime error, never a quiet downgrade to "no key".SHIFT_UPDATE_URLat build time bakes a different feed into the binary.SHIFT_UPDATE_URLin the environment of a running copy wins over the baked value, which is how a fork or a staging branch is tested.
A source tree with no remote builds an updater that reports "no feed" rather than guessing at one.
What the app does with it
- Once a day, at startup (and on demand from Settings → Updates), the manifest is
fetched with the system HTTP client —
/usr/bin/curlon macOS and Linux,Invoke-WebRequeston Windows. The day of the last probe is stored insettings.json, so restarts cannot spend the day's check twice. - Versions are compared with semver rules, prereleases included:
0.2.0-alphasorts below0.2.0, so a test build does not offer to downgrade itself. - Download writes into a temp folder, then two gates run before anything can be
installed: the byte length must equal the manifest's
size, and the recomputed SHA256 must equal the manifest'ssha256. A mismatch deletes the file and reports the error, so a truncated or swapped installer never reaches the installer step. - Install & relaunch applies the verified artifact and restarts Shift on it, as described in the next section; Discard removes the download. When an update is available the tray menu gains a row that opens Settings on the Updates tab.
Manifest schema is checked, and a newer schema than this build understands is refused
instead of being parsed optimistically. Unknown platform keys are ignored, so the
manifest can name a platform an older app has never heard of. The Updates panel always
states which of the two properties the current feed satisfies, so an unsigned channel
never looks signed.
Applying an update
Neither operating system lets a running program replace its own executable, so the work
belongs to a helper that outlives the app. update_install writes a script into the
download folder, starts it detached, and exits about half a second later; the script waits
for that pid to disappear and only then touches the installed copy.
| Platform | What the helper does |
|---|---|
| macOS | Mounts the downloaded .dmg, dittos the new bundle next to the old one, swaps them with two mv calls, removes the quarantine flag, detaches the image, and opens the result |
| Windows | Waits for shift.exe to leave the process table, runs the installer with /S, then starts the shift.exe the installer wrote |
| Linux, and a macOS binary run outside a bundle | Nothing is replaced; the artifact is opened instead, and the panel says so |
Both scripts are written so a failure cannot end with Shift simply closed: every macOS
failure path still opens the bundle it had, and the swap is move aside, move in, so a
copy that fails halfway leaves the previous version where it was. Before the handoff
starts, macOS writes a probe file next to the bundle — a root-owned copy in
/Applications is reported as "open the downloaded installer yourself" rather than
quietly quitting on an update that could not be applied.
The Windows installer is the same one a user runs by hand, so the update path cannot drift
from the manual one. Because the silent install comes from Shift itself, ${Silent} skips
the interactive "Shift is running, close it?" box: the app already told the user it is
about to restart, and a box nobody can answer would abort the update.
This is not a delta update and not a signature check on the running binary: the same SHA256 gate that guards a manual install is the only integrity gate, and the manifest signature rules in "Signing the channel" apply unchanged.
Replacing the bundle gives it a new code-signing hash, and macOS keys permissions such as Screen Recording to that hash. A release signed with the same identity as the copy it replaces normally keeps its approvals; a locally signed build, where every build has its own identity, can ask again after an update. That is the same consequence a manual reinstall has, and it is why the notarized-build item in the roadmap is worth closing.
Trust boundary
Two properties, two mechanisms:
- Integrity of the installer — byte length plus recomputed SHA256 against the manifest. Always enforced, in every build.
- Authenticity of the manifest — a detached ed25519 signature verified against a baked
public key. Enforced in every build that was compiled with
SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY.
A build without a key falls back to the weaker trust it had before signing existed: the
HTTPS connection to the forge plus whoever can push to releases. That is the only
remaining gap for such a build, and the panel says so out loud. Developer ID signing plus
notarization for the macOS package — which macOS requires for downloaded apps regardless —
is still open and tracked in docs/ROADMAP.md under M5.
scripts/release-key.py verify ~/.config/shift-release/release.pub \
manifest.json manifest.sig # check a channel by hand
Verifying a channel by hand
SHIFT_UPDATE_URL="https://host/owner/repo/raw/branch/releases/shift-update.json" \
cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored # from src-tauri/
cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored # unsigned build: integrity only
SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY=<hex> cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored
The test fetches the real feed, checks the manifest signature when the build carries a key, then downloads the artifact for this platform and architecture and checks size and hash against what is on disk. A baked key that is valid but not the publisher's fails the test, which is the proof that the check is real and not a pass-through.
State of the published channel
Checked against the live releases branch of this repository:
Version 0.1.3, checked by downloading each artifact back from the raw endpoint rather than trusting the local copy:
| Key | Artifact | Verified from the remote |
|---|---|---|
macos |
Shift-macOS-universal.dmg (55,528,662 B) |
bytes downloaded, SHA256 matches the manifest |
windows |
Shift-Setup-0.1.3-win-x64.exe (24,517,835 B) |
bytes downloaded, SHA256 matches the manifest |
windows-arm64 |
not published | by choice — see "Supported release targets" |
linux |
not published | by choice: Linux is a build target here, not a shipped product |
shift-update.sig verifies over the manifest's exact bytes against the key baked into both
artifacts. The channel's home is derived from origin at build time, and this forge is
Gitea, so the raw form is /raw/branch/releases/.
Both artifacts carry the key and the feed URL, which is what makes an in-app upgrade possible at all: a build whose binary predates those constants reports "this build has no feed" and can never see the channel, however new it is.
The forge runs no Actions, so nothing on this list was built by CI: every artifact was
cross-compiled on one macOS host and pushed with scripts/publish-release.sh. Treat "pass
CI" in the contributing guide as a definition to run locally, not a gate that already ran.
A Linux release would slot in under the linux key with no code change — artifact_keys_for
already answers linux for that host — so publishing one is a build task, not a feature.