nex_shift/docs/RELEASE.md

18 KiB

Releases and updates

Shift's update channel is this repository. There is no update server, no object storage, and no release service to configure: the installers and a small manifest are pushed to a git branch, and a running copy reads that branch over HTTPS.

The channel

An orphan branch named releases holds exactly one release:

releases/
├── shift-update.json
├── shift-update.sig
├── Shift-macOS-universal.dmg
└── Shift-Setup-0.1.1-win-x64.exe

shift-update.json names the version and, per platform, the artifact file, its size in bytes and its SHA256:

{
  "schema": 1,
  "version": "0.1.1",
  "date": "2026-10-26",
  "notes": "",
  "artifacts": {
    "macos": { "file": "Shift-macOS-universal.dmg", "sha256": "57fc…", "size": 55479751 },
    "windows": { "file": "Shift-Setup-0.1.1-win-x64.exe", "sha256": "0255…", "size": 24545040 }
  }
}

Supported release targets

Shift ships two installers: macOS (universal) and Windows x64. That is a scope decision, not a code limit, and it decides what the channel may contain:

Key Shipped Notes
macos yes One universal bundle, Apple silicon and Intel. The DMG, because that is what the in-app updater mounts
— yes Shift-macOS-universal.pkg, also macOS universal: the file to hand a machine installing Shift for the first time. It carries no manifest key — see "macOS packaging"
windows yes x64, which is also what an ARM machine falls back to
windows-arm64 no Buildable — build-windows-release.sh --arch arm64 still works — just not published
linux no Build target, not a product; see below

Publishing an ARM64 Windows build later needs no code change: the ladder already prefers windows-arm64 and falls back to windows, so adding the file to artifacts/ and re-publishing is enough.

Keys are platform, then platform and architecture where they differ. A build picks the first key its own architecture matches and never crosses operating systems:

Running on Keys tried, in order
macOS (Apple silicon or Intel) macos
Windows x64 windows
Windows ARM64 windows-arm64, then windows
Linux linux

The ARM64 fallback to windows is deliberate: Windows on ARM runs x64 binaries under emulation, so a channel that only carries x64 keeps serving ARM machines exactly as it did before the ARM build existed. artifact_keys_for and select_artifact in src-tauri/src/update.rs hold that ladder and are tested directly, so the rule is fixed by a test rather than by a comment.

The branch is rebuilt as a fresh root commit on every publish and force-pushed, so it never accumulates gigabytes of installer history while main stays clean.

macOS packaging

Shift builds are ad-hoc signed (signingIdentity: "-" in tauri.conf.json) and are not notarized — notarization needs an Apple Developer ID account, which this project does not have. Gatekeeper therefore cannot vouch for any Shift build, and what a fresh machine says depends on how the binary is signed:

Signing What a fresh machine says
Ad-hoc (Signature=adhoc) — current "cannot be opened because it is from an unidentified developer", and the box offers a way through: Cancel, then right-click → 打开, or 允许 in 系统设置 → 隐私与安全性
Self-signed certificate "cannot be opened because it is damaged" / reported as malware, with only 移至废纸篓 — no override, no pane entry to approve
Developer ID + notarized Opens on double-click, no prompt

The middle row is the trap that cost a release. Signing with a locally created certificate ("Shift Local Signing") looks better — codesign on the build machine reports valid on disk and satisfies its Designated Requirement, and spctl even accepts it — but the certificate lives only in that one Mac's keychain, is self-issued, and is CA:FALSE, so on any other machine it cannot chain to a trusted root. Sequoia turns an unchainable signature on a quarantined download into a hard refusal, which is strictly worse than no certificate at all. If the identity is used again it must be installed and trusted on every machine, which is not something to ask of a user.

So: ad-hoc, and the two containers each cover one job.

Container First launch on a fresh machine
.pkg, via Installer.app or installer installer does not propagate quarantine onto what it installs, so the app opens with no prompt at all. Verified: an installed copy carries com.apple.provenance and no com.apple.quarantine. The package itself is unsigned (productsign needs an Installer Signing certificate; a code-signing identity is rejected), so a browser-downloaded package may need right-click → 打开 once, before anything installs. installer -pkg … -target / needs nothing.
.dmg, app dragged to /Applications The app keeps the browser's quarantine flag, so the first launch needs the one approval above. Shift's own downloader sets no quarantine flag, which is why in-app updates never prompt — only a browser download on a new machine does.

scripts/macos-pkg.sh <Shift.app> <out.pkg> builds the package: it stages the bundle under an /Applications root and runs pkgbuild, which neither re-signs nor strips the payload — the CDHash is identical in the built bundle, the DMG copy and the pkg copy.

The macos manifest key stays a DMG on purpose: update_install's handoff mounts the image with hdiutil and copies the bundle out of it, so pointing the key at a .pkg would make every in-app update fail to mount.

Closing this for good means an Apple Developer ID: Developer ID Application + notarytool + stapler staple. Then both containers open on double-click with no pane to visit, and Screen Recording approval stops resetting between builds because the identity stops changing.

Publishing

pnpm tauri build --target universal-apple-darwin --bundles app,dmg
scripts/macos-pkg.sh src-tauri/target/universal-apple-darwin/release/bundle/macos/Shift.app \
                     artifacts/Shift-macOS-universal.pkg   # the first-install container
printf 'Fixes the ring on external displays.\n' > /tmp/notes.md
scripts/publish-release.sh --notes /tmp/notes.md     # hash, commit, push

scripts/publish-release.sh hashes every file in artifacts/, builds the manifest, writes the tree with git plumbing (update-index → write-tree → commit-tree → update-ref, through a temporary GIT_INDEX_FILE so the working tree is untouched) and force-pushes releases. The manifest and the pushed bytes cannot disagree, because the same Python pass that walks the files produces both.

Flag Effect
--notes FILE Release notes shown in the Updates panel
--key FILE Sign the manifest with this ed25519 key (SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY also works)
--dry-run Print the manifest and the tree that would be pushed; write nothing
--no-push Commit locally on releases but leave the remote alone
--branch NAME Publish to another channel instead of releases

Recognised installers: Shift-macOS-universal.dmg (macOS), Shift-Setup-<version>-win-x64.exe and Shift-Setup-<version>-win-arm64.exe (Windows, keys windows and windows-arm64), *.AppImage / *.deb (Linux). Other files in artifacts/ — the macOS .pkg, the portable ZIPs, SHA256SUMS.txt, the README-Windows-<arch>.txt notes — travel with the branch and are downloadable from it, but are not offered as installers by the manifest. The .pkg carries no key on purpose: the macos key must stay a DMG so the in-app handoff can mount it ("macOS packaging"). Dotfiles and an old manifest are skipped.

Both Windows architectures come from one command, which cross-compiles each target, checks the PE machine field of the binary it just built (0x8664 for x64, 0xAA64 for ARM64) so a wrong --target cannot ship an x64 EXE inside an arm64 package, and gates the installer to the matching machine:

scripts/build-windows-release.sh                    # both architectures
scripts/build-windows-release.sh --arch arm64       # one of them
scripts/build-windows-release.sh --skip-build       # repackage existing EXEs

Signing the channel

Integrity says the download matches the manifest; authenticity says the manifest came from you. scripts/release-key.py closes that gap with one ed25519 key.

scripts/release-key.py keygen ~/.config/shift-release/release.ed25519
# -> prints the hex public key to bake into the build

export SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY=~/.config/shift-release/release.ed25519
pnpm tauri build --target universal-apple-darwin --bundles app,dmg   # macOS
scripts/build-windows-release.sh          # both Windows architectures
scripts/publish-release.sh --key "$SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY"

Give the release build SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY (the hex key) and it can verify the feed; give it SHIFT_RELEASE_KEY (the private key) and build-windows-release.sh derives the public key from it, so a cross-build can never be packaged with a key that does not match the signature publish-release.sh --key produces. Without either, the script prints no release key: this build will report the feed as unsigned rather than letting it pass for a quieter log.

The signature is detached: shift-update.sig holds base64 over the manifest's exact bytes, so verification needs no JSON canonicalisation rules and the manifest's formatting stays free to change. It is fetched from the directory that already holds the manifest, so a staging feed needs only its own manifest plus signature — a fork never configures a second URL.

Build Feed Result
Key baked signature verifies update offered, panel says the signature was verified
Key baked signature missing or wrong check fails with that reason; nothing is offered
No key any integrity gate only; panel says this build cannot verify a signature

The key is the one secret in this design. Losing it means publishing a new app build with a new baked key; leaking it means an attacker can publish anything to the channel, exactly as leaking push access to releases already does today. Keep it outside the repository — ~/.config/shift-release/ is where the local publishing machine keeps it.

Where a build looks for updates

src-tauri/build.rs derives the feed from the origin remote at build time:

Remote Feed URL
Gitea / Forgejo https://host/owner/repo/raw/branch/releases/shift-update.json
GitHub https://github.com/owner/repo/raw/releases/shift-update.json
GitLab https://gitlab.example/owner/repo/-/raw/releases/shift-update.json

Two overrides exist, and neither needs a rebuild of the frontend:

  • SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY at build time bakes in the release key; anything that is not 32 bytes of hex fails the build rather than silently producing an updater that trusts the feed anyway. A key that parses but is not a curve point is a runtime error, never a quiet downgrade to "no key".
  • SHIFT_UPDATE_URL at build time bakes a different feed into the binary.
  • SHIFT_UPDATE_URL in the environment of a running copy wins over the baked value, which is how a fork or a staging branch is tested.

A source tree with no remote builds an updater that reports "no feed" rather than guessing at one.

What the app does with it

  1. Once a day, at startup (and on demand from Settings → Updates), the manifest is fetched with the system HTTP client — /usr/bin/curl on macOS and Linux, Invoke-WebRequest on Windows. The day of the last probe is stored in settings.json, so restarts cannot spend the day's check twice.
  2. Versions are compared with semver rules, prereleases included: 0.2.0-alpha sorts below 0.2.0, so a test build does not offer to downgrade itself.
  3. Download writes into a temp folder, then two gates run before anything can be installed: the byte length must equal the manifest's size, and the recomputed SHA256 must equal the manifest's sha256. A mismatch deletes the file and reports the error, so a truncated or swapped installer never reaches the installer step.
  4. Install & relaunch applies the verified artifact and restarts Shift on it, as described in the next section; Discard removes the download. When an update is available the tray menu gains a row that opens Settings on the Updates tab.

Manifest schema is checked, and a newer schema than this build understands is refused instead of being parsed optimistically. Unknown platform keys are ignored, so the manifest can name a platform an older app has never heard of. The Updates panel always states which of the two properties the current feed satisfies, so an unsigned channel never looks signed.

Applying an update

Neither operating system lets a running program replace its own executable, so the work belongs to a helper that outlives the app. update_install writes a script into the download folder, starts it detached, and exits about half a second later; the script waits for that pid to disappear and only then touches the installed copy.

Platform What the helper does
macOS Mounts the downloaded .dmg, dittos the new bundle next to the old one, swaps them with two mv calls, removes the quarantine flag, detaches the image, and opens the result
Windows Waits for shift.exe to leave the process table, runs the installer with /S, then starts the shift.exe the installer wrote
Linux, and a macOS binary run outside a bundle Nothing is replaced; the artifact is opened instead, and the panel says so

Both scripts are written so a failure cannot end with Shift simply closed: every macOS failure path still opens the bundle it had, and the swap is move aside, move in, so a copy that fails halfway leaves the previous version where it was. Before the handoff starts, macOS writes a probe file next to the bundle — a root-owned copy in /Applications is reported as "open the downloaded installer yourself" rather than quietly quitting on an update that could not be applied.

The Windows installer is the same one a user runs by hand, so the update path cannot drift from the manual one. Because the silent install comes from Shift itself, ${Silent} skips the interactive "Shift is running, close it?" box: the app already told the user it is about to restart, and a box nobody can answer would abort the update.

This is not a delta update and not a signature check on the running binary: the same SHA256 gate that guards a manual install is the only integrity gate, and the manifest signature rules in "Signing the channel" apply unchanged.

Replacing the bundle gives it a new code-signing hash, and macOS keys permissions such as Screen Recording to that hash. A release signed with the same identity as the copy it replaces normally keeps its approvals; a locally signed build, where every build has its own identity, can ask again after an update. That is the same consequence a manual reinstall has, and it is why the notarized-build item in the roadmap is worth closing.

Trust boundary

Two properties, two mechanisms:

  • Integrity of the installer — byte length plus recomputed SHA256 against the manifest. Always enforced, in every build.
  • Authenticity of the manifest — a detached ed25519 signature verified against a baked public key. Enforced in every build that was compiled with SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY.

A build without a key falls back to the weaker trust it had before signing existed: the HTTPS connection to the forge plus whoever can push to releases. That is the only remaining gap for such a build, and the panel says so out loud. Developer ID signing plus notarization for the macOS package — which macOS requires for downloaded apps regardless — is still open and tracked in docs/ROADMAP.md under M5.

scripts/release-key.py verify ~/.config/shift-release/release.pub \
  manifest.json manifest.sig        # check a channel by hand

Verifying a channel by hand

SHIFT_UPDATE_URL="https://host/owner/repo/raw/branch/releases/shift-update.json" \
  cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored      # from src-tauri/
cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored          # unsigned build: integrity only
SHIFT_UPDATE_PUBKEY=<hex> cargo test --lib update:: -- --ignored

The test fetches the real feed, checks the manifest signature when the build carries a key, then downloads the artifact for this platform and architecture and checks size and hash against what is on disk. A baked key that is valid but not the publisher's fails the test, which is the proof that the check is real and not a pass-through.

State of the published channel

Checked against the live releases branch of this repository:

Version 0.1.3, checked by downloading each artifact back from the raw endpoint rather than trusting the local copy:

Key Artifact Verified from the remote
macos Shift-macOS-universal.dmg (55,528,662 B) bytes downloaded, SHA256 matches the manifest
windows Shift-Setup-0.1.3-win-x64.exe (24,517,835 B) bytes downloaded, SHA256 matches the manifest
windows-arm64 not published by choice — see "Supported release targets"
linux not published by choice: Linux is a build target here, not a shipped product

Shift-macOS-universal.pkg sits on the same branch with no manifest key, for first installs ("macOS packaging"); it was hashed the same way and downloaded back to check.

shift-update.sig verifies over the manifest's exact bytes against the key baked into both artifacts. The channel's home is derived from origin at build time, and this forge is Gitea, so the raw form is /raw/branch/releases/.

Both artifacts carry the key and the feed URL, which is what makes an in-app upgrade possible at all: a build whose binary predates those constants reports "this build has no feed" and can never see the channel, however new it is.

The forge runs no Actions, so nothing on this list was built by CI: every artifact was cross-compiled on one macOS host and pushed with scripts/publish-release.sh. Treat "pass CI" in the contributing guide as a definition to run locally, not a gate that already ran.

A Linux release would slot in under the linux key with no code change — artifact_keys_for already answers linux for that host — so publishing one is a build task, not a feature.