A folder named 概念/实体/Concepts was stripped from category_path as model noise, so a page moved into it kept depth 0 and a root-level wiki_path and rendered at the root of the directory tree. Folder paths are authoritative and now map to category_path verbatim; the model-label cleaner still applies to pages without a folder.
Fixes#3053
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DFSMrLZZ3oq1dKmJFAofz6
Eager remote images freeze large Markdown previews, but a scheme-based
allowlist also hid data:image URLs that document parsers emit. Keep lazy
loading on a preview-only sanitizer that matches DOMPurify's URI policy.
* fix(session): serve org-shared KB images through the message file proxy
The message-scoped file proxy only authorized resources whose tenant
matched the message's agent tenant, so replies produced by an agent of
the caller's own workspace over an org-shared knowledge base rendered
text but lost every image with 403 (#3022).
Fall back to the org-share relation for exactly that case: the
message's persisted retrieval references must contain the resource
handle (chunk evidence — an unrelated handle from the owner tenant
cannot ride along), the reference's knowledge base must belong to the
resource's tenant, and that KB must still be shared to the caller with
at least viewer permission. Messages written before agent_tenant_id
existed get the same fallback before the shared-agent relation is
demanded; the shared-agent path itself is unchanged.
* fix(session): prove shared-KB images from agent steps and image_info
Smart-reasoning turns never persist KnowledgeReferences, and OCR hits often
keep the resource handle only in image_info. Collect tool retrieval onto the
message and accept that evidence in the message-file proxy so org-shared KB
images stop 403ing.
* fix(session): keep shared-KB image evidence in the message-file proxy
Drop the agent-engine KnowledgeRefs collector so pre-push does not lint the
whole agent package. AgentSteps already persist knowledge_search hits, which
is enough for the proxy to authorize org-shared images.
---------
Co-authored-by: vicfei <vicfei@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Wiki ingest makes several independent LLM calls per document and already
retries transient failures (408/429/5xx, timeouts, connection resets) with
exponential backoff, but some gateways report QPM/QPS throttling as HTTP
403 instead of 429 (e.g. DeepSeek MaaS: code 0x04030020, message
"调用频率(qpm)超限"). Those 403s were classified as permanent caller
errors and the wiki span failed immediately with EXTRACT_FAILED /
SUMMARY_FAILED, so a QPM burst aborted generation for the whole batch
(issue #2688).
isTransientLLMError now also matches "status 403" errors whose embedded
response body carries rate-limit wording (qpm/qps, rate limit, too many
requests, throttled, 调用频率/频率超限/请求过于频繁/繁忙, try again
later, slow down). Authorization-shaped 403s (invalid key, forbidden,
permission denied) and unrelated bodies stay permanent, so the change
cannot turn authz failures into retry loops.
Tests: 14-case table covering rate-limit 403 acceptance and
authorization-shaped 403 rejection, all existing isTransientLLMError
cases unchanged and passing.
* feat(sandbox): run sandboxed execs as root by default
Every chat session owns its own sandbox, so the in-container account is
not a tenant boundary and root is the least surprising default for an
agent that installs packages and writes wherever it needs. Host and
cross-tenant isolation stay at the container boundary.
DefaultSandboxExecUser becomes "root" (remote_client.go) and the sandbox
image ends with USER root. The three backends keep naming the account
explicitly on every exec so the account a call lands on does not depend
on which backend a workspace selected; the adapter default, the file
operations and the artifact-directory bootstrap all follow the constant.
The template still provisions a uid 1000 "user" account for interop with
E2B/Cube tooling that addresses it by name.
Root also makes the skill-install flow's account hand-over pointless, so
it goes: verification no longer runs after a chown/chmod lock-down and a
repair round no longer reopens the tree (normalizeSkillPermissions and
reopenSkillDirForRepair are gone), and the prepare and scratch commands
stop chowning. The scratch wipe now also clears /tmp, and the cache
budget guard sizes only root's caches, since no second account can grow
one. Verification is asserted to stay on the ordinary executor (no
AsRoot, no AllowSkillsRoot) rather than on which account it ran as.
* refactor(skills): install chat-time extras into the skill's own env
PYTHONPATH / NODE_PATH pointed at a per-session overlay
(/workspace/.skill-packages/<skill>) because the skill tree was frozen
after install: root-owned, mode 555, and often built by `uv venv` with no
pip, so `pip install --target` somewhere else was the only way a chat
session could add a package.
None of that holds now. The lock-down is gone and execs run as root, so a
missing package goes straight into the skill's own environment, and the
write is already session-local: a chat sandbox is built from the config's
image and its filesystem dies with the session, so nothing reaches the
image other sessions start from. The overlay bought nothing over that
while splitting one skill's packages across two locations.
SessionSkillPackageDir goes, and applySessionPackagePath becomes
applySkillNodePath: it appends the skill's own node_modules after
whatever the caller supplied, replacing a `+=` that prepended a bare
separator once the overlay stopped seeding the variable. No PYTHONPATH is
injected at all. Python dependencies are reached through the skill's venv
interpreter, which the shell wrapper already puts first on PATH; the
overlay-era value named the venv root, which is not an importable path.
PYTHONPATH stays on the injected-name blacklist so a stored value cannot
shadow the venv.
The runtime hints and every prompt that described the overlay now name
`<skillDir>/.venv/bin/python -m pip install` and `npm install` in the
skill directory. frozenSkillTreeGuidance / isFrozenSkillVenvFailure are
renamed for what they detect now that nothing is frozen.
* docs(prompts): reserve /workspace/output for finished deliverables
/workspace/output is the one directory an artifact collector reads, so
everything written there is offered to the user as a deliverable. The
prompts described it as the place for "deliverables" or "downloadable
artifacts" without saying it is exclusively that, which reads as "the
directory you write results to" — and a model doing multi-step work has
results at every step. Drafts, intermediate renders and debug dumps land
next to the finished file and the user is handed all of them.
The four places that describe the workspace now say the same thing: the
collector reads only /workspace/output, so finished deliverables go there
and everything in progress goes anywhere else under /workspace. The
attachment block gains the matching half for the other direction —
/workspace/input holds the user's own files and is not ours to write to,
which it previously implied by calling the paths "read-only inputs" while
the tools that enforce it say so plainly.
Only the /workspace/input half is enforced (write_sandbox_file refuses
that tree). Whether a file is finished is a judgement no tool can make,
so the output half stays guidance and is stated wherever the model is
already reading about the workspace rather than in one place it might
not see.
* fix(skills): restore executable bundles and package recovery
* style(sandbox): wrap prompt text for repository lint checks
* fix(sandbox): guard recovery paths and document root execution
---------
Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Connectors already fill FetchedItem.UpdatedAt (Feishu from the real edit
time), but ingestItem dropped it: the persisted metadata only carried
external_id, source_resource_id and datasource_id, and the knowledge
row's own UpdatedAt moves on every re-parse, so nothing downstream could
tell how old a document is.
Write it into metadata as source_updated_at (RFC3339, UTC) when the
connector supplied one, and leave the key out otherwise so an absent
time stays distinguishable from a zero one.
Refs #3016
NormalizeKnowledgeFolderPath capped a directory name with
segment[:MaxKnowledgeFolderSegmentLength] (internal/types/knowledge_folder.go:51).
That is a raw byte index, so a name longer than 128 bytes was cut wherever
byte 128 landed. For a Chinese folder name that is inside the 43rd character,
and the leading bytes of the half-cut character stay in the string.
The result is an invalid UTF-8 folder_path. json.Marshal replaces the broken
bytes with U+FFFD, so the path the client reads back is not the path stored in
the row, and RenameKnowledgeFolder (internal/application/service/knowledge.go:611)
normalizes that returned value and matches nothing.
The cut now backs off to the nearest rune start. The cap stays a byte budget,
so a 60-character Chinese name keeps its first 42 characters (126 bytes)
instead of 128 bytes ending in half a character. ASCII names are unchanged.
fillSecretsFromStoredModel only copied APIKey/AppSecret from the stored
model into the test request, so the temporary test model built by
buildTestModel always had a nil ExtraConfig. Any provider-specific
setting (thinking_control, api_version, remote_model_name, ...) was
silently dropped from POST /initialization/remote/check, making the
'Test Connection' button validate a bare model instead of the stored
configuration — and masking fixes that depend on extra_config.
Request-provided values keep precedence: extraConfig is only filled
when the request does not carry one, matching the existing secret
semantics ('non-empty request values are always preferred').
Fixes#3057
* fix(chat): keep OCR/caption text of scanned-page image hits in merge
When pdf_force_scanned is enabled, the recognized page text lives only
in image_ocr/image_caption child chunks, while the parent markdown is
cut from image placeholders alone. The merge stage's image_parent_resolve
overwrote the hit content with the pruned parent markdown, so the OCR
text never reached the LLM context and answers degraded to placeholders.
Save the hit chunk's own body before the parent expansion and re-attach
it via JoinChunkContent, which collapses duplicates, so normal multimodal
hits (whose text is already covered by the surrounding content) are not
duplicated.
Fixes#3052
* fix(chat): avoid duplicating scanned OCR after parent merge
Re-attaching the image hit body into Content would be injected again
from ImageInfo during chat enrichment. Clear the matching OCR/caption
field so the model sees one copy, and cover caption plus pruned-placeholder paths.
* style(chat): wrap long merge parent-resolve test fixture
---------
Co-authored-by: LuckVd <LuckVd@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Local storage prefixes now join under the base directory instead of
filepath.Join, FAQ import rejects client task IDs that can leak into
object names, and wiki list ORDER BY uses quoted identifiers instead of
sprintf.
* fix(system): keep one-time create-user passwords from being discarded
Escape leaked to the Settings modal, and a double submit could replace a
201 reveal with an idempotent 200. Show the password in plaintext and
distinguish create vs retry via an idempotent body flag.
* i18n(system): update copy button and success message for account details
Changed the labels for the copy button and success message across multiple languages in the localization files to reflect the new terminology for copying account details instead of just passwords. This update enhances clarity for users when interacting with the Create User dialog.
* i18n(system): add createUser strings for SystemAdmin dialog
* ui(system): add Create user dialog to the Access settings tab
Wire the unused createSystemUser API to a third row in the SystemAdmin
Access section. The dialog (CreateUserDialog.vue) has two views:
- Form: username, email, and an auto-generate toggle that reveals
new/confirm password fields when off.
- Reveal: one-time generated password the admin must acknowledge;
overlay click, Esc, and the close button are disabled until then.
Also:
- The idempotent 200 OK path (no generated_password) closes with its
own success toast.
- The teleported dialog shell is shared via systemAdminDialog.less.
- Password policy comes from upstream's @/utils/passwordPolicy
(complex-password aware) rather than a local shared module.
* i18n(audit): register system.user_created for the SystemAuditLog
* feat(mcp): add per-tool enable toggle
* style: format migration test
* fix(mcp): keep enable and approval updates from overwriting each other
Partial policy writes now touch only the supplied columns, and a missing
tenant fails closed so a disabled tool cannot slip through.
---------
Co-authored-by: myysophia <myysophia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
IndexMessageToKB returned silently when getChatHistoryConfig yielded nil,
so an operator who enabled message indexing in the UI could see
"indexed messages: 0" with nothing in the logs to explain it.
The two paths disagree on what "enabled" means:
GetChatHistoryKBStats -> cfg != nil && cfg.Enabled
IndexMessageToKB -> cfg.IsConfigured(), which also requires
EmbeddingModelID != "" && KnowledgeBaseID != ""
So Enabled=true with either field empty reports the feature as on while
every message is skipped, and the skip emitted no log line at all.
Log the specific missing precondition instead. Behaviour is unchanged -
this only makes an existing silent path attributable.
* feat(agent): unify sandbox tools and drop host preloaded skills
Read workspace and skill files through read_file, and run installed or staged skills through shell_exec(skill_name). Remove the unused skills/preloaded tree and keep generated-file previews stable across re-renders.
* fix(frontend): do not assume classList in markdown sanitize hooks
Node unit tests stub anchors without a DOM classList. Detect download cards from class/download attributes instead.
Sessions owned by synthetic principals (api_external_user:<tenant>:<id>,
api_tenant_key:<tenant>:<keyID>) have no real account row to display, so
the sidebar previously showed nothing about who created them. Render a
small badge next to the title: the readable sub for external-user
sessions, a generic "API" tag for key-scoped sessions. Regular
account/web sessions stay unchanged (no badge).
user_id already flows through mapSessionRow -> bucket items ->
SessionSidebarRow; only the render was missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
The editor no longer exposes inbound access; saves omit
allow_public_inbound so the zero value (require credentials) is stored.
Cube L7 rules can be moved so first-match-wins order is explicit.
* feat(sandbox): add the tenant network policy with its secrets and validation
Administrators need control over sandbox network access, so a named sandbox
config gains a network policy block. It lives inside the existing config JSONB,
so there is no schema change and old rows read back as the zero value.
Both booleans are phrased so that the zero value IS the intended default --
outbound open, inbound closed. That makes "no network block" and "explicitly
saved defaults" provably the same thing, and avoids a tri-state pointer where
nil would have to mean "allowed" for egress and "closed" for ingress.
Injected header values are credentials, so they ride the encrypt-at-rest and
mask-on-read path EnvVars already uses instead of a parallel mechanism. One
CloneWithSecrets traversal serves encrypt, decrypt and mask so the three
directions cannot disagree about which fields are secret.
Validation runs at save time because the alternative is failing at
sandbox-create time, where the admin no longer has the form in front of them.
It rejects both what a provider would refuse and what a provider would accept
without doing what the admin meant -- a domain allowlist with no deny-all
fallback still leaves every unresolved destination reachable.
* feat(sandbox): apply the network policy on both providers, persist the inbound token
Resolve the stored policy into one fully specified provider-neutral policy so
that nothing downstream re-derives a default. Both booleans come out non-nil on
every path, including the nil-tenant one, because a partially specified policy
would let the adapters fall back to their providers' more permissive defaults.
The three inversions (deny-egress to allow-internet, public-inbound, rule-deny
to rule-allow) happen in exactly one place.
Every sandbox-creating path carries it, so sessions, skill installs and the
deep connectivity check all run under the same config's policy rather than
each wiring its own.
Inbound access defaults to CLOSED, deliberately stricter than either
provider's own default: a sandbox URL reachable by anyone who learns the ID is
not a reasonable default for a tenant's workspace. Closing it makes the
provider issue a per-sandbox traffic token, and only at create time -- so the
token is stored with the session binding and replayed through Connect on every
reconnect. Without that, a sandbox that was paused on TTL or rebound after a
restart would answer 403 on every exec and file read, and 403 classifies as an
authentication error rather than NotFound, so the binding would never be
replaced and the session would stay wedged.
Connect therefore takes a request struct instead of a bare ID, which gives the
token a single documented way in rather than implicit state inside an adapter.
Metadata-based recovery is the one reconnect path with no binding to read the
token from. Rather than adopt a sandbox that would be permanently 403, it is
deleted and replaced -- but only for providers that have the credential at
all, since Docker has no inbound token and its containers are still adoptable.
go-e2b keeps the token and never sends it, so for E2B the data-plane
RoundTripper attaches the header from a process-local registry. Cube's SDK
already does this itself.
* fix(sandbox): classify data-plane traffic by authority shape, not the configured domain
isDataPlane suffix-matched the configured sandbox domain, which was wrong in
both directions. Both required a configured proxy_url, so E2B Cloud's default
usage was unaffected; the affected deployments are exactly the self-hosted and
E2B-compatible ones the gateway exists for.
A configured gateway could be silently ignored. sandbox_domain is optional for
E2B -- MissingRequiredFields asks only for api_key and template_id -- and with
it empty the check returned false for everything. The general form is worse
than the empty case: go-e2b's envdBaseURL prefers the domain the control plane
reported over the client-wide one, so the authority actually dialled need not
appear in the config at all. The failure is quiet whenever public DNS happens
to resolve the sandbox domain, and the operator believes traffic is passing
through a gateway that never sees it.
Control-plane calls could be sent to the gateway. E2B's own defaults put the
API host under the sandbox domain (api.e2b.app beneath e2b.app), so the suffix
match classified every Create, Connect and List as data-plane traffic. That
is loud where the gateway does not serve the API, but where it proxies both
planes it succeeds while downgrading an X-API-Key request to plaintext for an
http:// gateway. Cube was immune to the first problem, since it requires both
fields, but not to this one.
Classify on the "<port>-<sandboxID>.<domain>" shape both SDKs generate, using
the SandboxIDFromDataPlaneHost helper that token injection on the very same
request already relies on -- so routing and injection now agree by
construction instead of applying two different rules. That helper exists
precisely because the configured domain is unreliable here; it was simply
never used for the routing half.
The control host stays as an explicit exclusion. The shape test already
rejects api.<domain>, so this only covers an API host that itself wears the
shape, such as 8080-api.example.com.
One existing assertion was replaced rather than kept: the E2B pool test proved
that the Cube fields were ignored by asserting a cube.app authority was not
data-plane traffic, which tested the domain matching rather than the field
selection. It now asserts the transport dials the E2B gateway address and not
the Cube one.
* feat(sandbox): add the network policy editor to the sandbox config drawer
The policy sits in the runtime step, directly under the settings it
constrains, rather than in a step of its own. The existing execution timeouts
were compressed into a two-column grid to make room, keeping each field's own
label and its own tip -- the reason they were one per row was that three
unlabelled numbers sharing a footnote gave no clue which one you were editing,
and two columns with per-field tips does not regress that.
Provider-specific sections are shown only for the backend that has them: the
Cube L7 rule cards, E2B's per-host header transforms, and for Docker just the
bridge/none selector, since Docker can only express the overall switch.
Injected header values are write-only. A stored one shows as configured and is
preserved when the input is left blank, which is how env-var secrets already
behave. Renaming a rule or a header is the case worth care: the merge indexes
credentials on the rule-and-header pair, so a rename means the old value can no
longer be recovered. One helper decides both the placeholder text and whether
the payload re-attaches the value, so the form cannot claim a credential is
kept while the save blanks it.
The add buttons use keys of their own instead of reusing the env-var table's
"add variable", which read wrongly under a list of network destinations and
which the i18n key check cannot catch, since the key exists in every bundle.
* docs(sandbox): document the network policy and its inbound default change
The existing network bullet described the pre-feature state -- both providers
open by default, tunable only through the neutral policy at create time --
which is no longer true of the defaults or of the admin-facing surface.
Three things needed writing down rather than restating.
The inbound default flips from publicly reachable to credential-required. A
deployment that relies on a browser or an external service reaching a sandbox
port directly, rather than going through WeKnora, has to opt back in on that
config.
The binding store now holds a bearer credential in plaintext. Leaving it
unencrypted was a deliberate trade -- per-reconnect crypto on the hot path
against Redis's own access control -- and the trade is only sound if the
requirement is actually stated, along with the code-side constraint it depends
on: a binding or a handle is never logged whole, only the sandbox ID and
whether a credential is present.
On binding loss, a closed-inbound Cube or E2B config no longer adopts its old
sandbox by metadata. The token went with the binding and the provider will not
reissue it, so adoption would produce a session that answers 403 on every
data-plane call with no way back. The sandbox is deleted and rebuilt, which
costs the /workspace scratch. Docker has no such credential and still adopts.
* fix(sandbox): fail closed when a closed-inbound create has no traffic token
A Cube/E2B sandbox created without the inbound token would be bound anyway,
then 403 on every data-plane call as an unreplaceable authentication error.
Refuse the create, destroy the sandbox, and stop Docker from persisting
inbound/egress radios it cannot honour. Canonicalize IPv4 /0 deny-all onto
0.0.0.0/0 and reject CR/LF in injected header names and values.
* fix(sandbox): satisfy pre-push lint on the network policy files
Unexport the data-plane host parser, drop file-level package docs that
revive rejected, and lowercase error-string prefixes that staticcheck
ST1005 treats as capitalized English.
* fix(sandbox): persist rotated inbound tokens and stop misreporting restricted egress
Connect can reissue the traffic token after pause/resume; write it back onto
the binding so a restart does not restore a stale credential that 403s and
cannot be replaced. Restore the volume-support i18n key, map Docker
network_mode=none onto deny-egress, inject the E2B inbound header without a
gateway pool, and fold header names when merging redacted secrets.
---------
Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Provider prefix caches only hit when system/tools stay byte-stable and
cache routing is actually on the request. Stop rewriting those prefixes
mid-turn, attach prompt_cache_key / cache_control, and log hit rate
instead of showing it in the conversation tree.
Large write/edit calls used to sit on a spinner until the full JSON
arrived. Emit path and running line counts from partial arguments so
the UI can update in place, without putting file bodies on the SSE wire.
Refuse truncated tool calls, compact-and-retry once on overflow, and let
sandbox files be appended, paged, and batch-edited instead of rewritten.
Models can set context_window (default 200K) so compaction sizes itself
from the real window; agent max_iterations of -1 means unlimited.
* fix(models): show usage details when deletion is blocked
* fix(models): open the matching agent section and cap usage lists
Agent "open configuration" now lands on the tab that owns the binding
(VLM/ASR vs follow-ups), and delete failures keep the server message when
structured details cannot be parsed. Listed KB/agent rows are capped at 50
while totals still drive the deletion guard and dialog headings.
---------
Co-authored-by: Leon <leon_hfut@foxmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Those /skills-sh/owner/repo/slug listings are federated, not native
@owner/slug pages, and the GitHub folder is often deeper than the URL
slug. Resolve them through ClawHub so the commit-pinned handoff names
the real skill path.
Three inconsistencies in how the sandbox tools are granted and bounded.
Tool checkboxes that decide nothing. list/read/write/edit_sandbox_file,
shell_exec, read_skill and execute_skill_script were offered in the settings
UI, but registerSandboxFileTools, registerSandboxShellIfAllowed and
initializeSkillsManager all register from the capability (a sandbox with a
session filesystem, SkillsEnabled, install mode) and never consult
AllowedTools. Clearing a checkbox changed nothing. Drop them from
AvailableToolDefinitions the way search_memory and web_search already are,
so the switch that decides is the only thing shown.
Readers narrower than writers. write_sandbox_file accepts anything under
/workspace except the attachment tree, while list/read stopped at the
artifact output dir, so the agent could not read back the scratch script it
had just written and had to detour through `shell_exec cat`. Since
shell_exec reaches those files anyway the narrowing bought no safety; the
inspectable roots now cover /workspace, still ordered so a reported root
names the artifact or attachment tree when the path is inside one.
Two answers for one directory. A WEKNORA_SKILL_OUTPUT_DIR override was
validated on the execution path (falling back to /workspace/output) but
taken as-is from the host environment by the tools and ArtifactCollector, so
an override outside /workspace pointed the readers at a directory no skill
could write. Both now go through sandbox.ValidatedSessionOutputDir.
The installer agent was recently given its working directory up front and
stopped prefixing `cd <skill-dir> &&` onto every command. Session agents
never got the same treatment: shell_exec only mentioned /workspace as the
work_dir default, so the model could not tell it was already there, and
execute_skill_script never said scripts run with /workspace as their cwd —
a relative path inside a skill script silently resolves outside the skill.
Describe the workspace once, where each tool is described: shell_exec gains
a Working Directory section (already in /workspace, relative paths, no `cd`
prefix, and each call starts there again so a `cd` does not carry over),
execute_skill_script states its cwd and points at $WEKNORA_SKILL_DIR, and
the skills prompt gains a Workspace section covering input, output and the
per-session package overlay.
Also drop the installer prompt's paragraph about write_sandbox_file and
friends: those tools are not registered in install mode, so the model never
sees them in its schema and the note only spent tokens describing — and
misdescribing — a scope it could not reach.