WeKnora/internal/handler/session
lyingbug b82fd6c0f9
fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings (#3416)
* fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings

Verified and fixed from the shared-space permission review:

- Embed channels kept knowledge_ids, tag_ids, mentioned_items, skill_names
  and summary_model_id from anonymous visitors. Mentions are only scoped
  for shared agents, so a visitor could query any KB (and pick any model)
  of the channel workspace by ID. The payload now drops them; the widget
  never sends them.
- PUT /knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki/issues/:issue_id/status updated any issue
  by ID. The update is now scoped to the path's KB (404 otherwise).
- A direct org invite let the inviter attach any user of the target
  workspace (or any user by ID) as its representative, whose username and
  email the roster then showed to all members. Direct adds attach no
  representative, and the roster returns emails only for the caller's own
  workspace.
- COS and KS3 dropped the bucket (and COS the region) segment when turning
  a path into an object key, while the tenant check scans every segment:
  cos://42/<region>/prefix/7/... passed as tenant 42 and read tenant 7's
  object from a shared bucket. Both must now match the service's config.
- Shared agent listings returned the full agent to receivers. Prompts and
  the creator's user ID are withheld; capabilities and scope stay visible.
- Temporary document uploads let the caller pick the parser engine (and
  its credentials) of a shared agent's workspace; only the agent's rules
  choose one there now.
- Suggested questions used request / message-snapshot knowledge_ids
  without a permission check. Each document is now resolved to its KB and
  checked like KB IDs, including a shared agent's scope.
- IM channels accepted any knowledge_base_id (and any agent ID on create).
  Both must belong to the channel's workspace, the KB also to a restricted
  API key's allow-list.
- KB-restricted API keys could list org-shared KBs outside their allow-list
  in the organization views; those listings are now filtered.
- With enable_rbac=false, RequireKBAccess let cross-workspace denials
  through. That switch is for roles inside a workspace; the guard now
  always denies another workspace's KB, since handlers behind it load by
  ID without a tenant filter.
- The org member limit was counted before and enforced apart from the
  insert; it is now checked in the insert's transaction with the
  organization row locked (SQLite serializes writers instead).
- The UpdateOrganization route comment and API doc said owner-only; the
  service and UI allow org admins. Comment and doc corrected.

Documented, not changed: issued /r/ and presigned links stay valid until
they expire after a share is revoked.

* fix(security): address review of the low-severity shared-space fixes

- Embed payloads also drop question_origin. It selects a KB like an
  @mention for agents that retrieve only when mentioned, and the widget
  never sends it; the selection stays inside the agent's scope, but an
  anonymous visitor should not pick among its KBs. suggestion_attribution is
  kept (the widget sends it and it is validated).
- The receiver view of a shared agent also withholds the follow-up
  suggestion instruction, a prompt like the others. Starter questions are
  shown to receivers anyway, and the sharer's name is displayed by design.
- Follow-up suggestion generation moves into the agent's workspace with
  types.WithExecutionTenant instead of a bare tenant rewrite, so the
  caller is pinned before the document permission check runs. The auth
  middleware and the shared run already pinned it; this removes the
  dependency on that.
- KS3 CopyFile copies only from the service's own bucket (as COS and S3
  do); another bucket's path is a cross-backend copy.

Tests cover the dropped question_origin, the follow-up instruction and the
/shared-agents listing, a follow-up context with the tenant switched, a
repeated wiki issue status update, and the KS3 copy source.
2026-09-18 22:58:46 +08:00
..
agent_stream_handler.go fix(agent): report failed tool executions as tool_result, not error 2026-09-18 11:11:21 +08:00
agent_stream_handler_test.go fix(agent): report failed tool executions as tool_result, not error 2026-09-18 11:11:21 +08:00
artifact_completion_test.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
artifact_download.go refactor(resource-access): unify scoped authorization and transfer recovery (#3097) 2026-09-08 15:36:33 +08:00
artifact_download_test.go refactor(resource-access): unify scoped authorization and transfer recovery (#3097) 2026-09-08 15:36:33 +08:00
artifact_library.go feat(artifacts): artifacts library page backed by a message_artifacts table (#3384) 2026-09-18 12:10:19 +08:00
artifact_reference.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
artifact_reference_test.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
attachment_processor.go feat(docparser): 引入 anydoc 引擎,在 Go 进程内解析 office 文档 2026-08-16 11:37:27 +08:00
browserskill.go feat(browser): connect local Chrome with task controls and display modes (#3180) 2026-09-11 17:59:27 +08:00
browserskill_test.go feat(browser): connect local Chrome with task controls and display modes (#3180) 2026-09-11 17:59:27 +08:00
chat_history_tenant_test.go fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408) 2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
command_output_test.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
continue_stream_resource_urls_test.go feat(chat): append messages to a running agent turn (#3123) 2026-09-09 16:43:33 +08:00
fork.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
fork_test.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
handler.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00
helpers.go refactor: remove unused private Go helpers 2026-09-17 15:51:51 +08:00
helpers_test.go fix(chat): align live timestamps with persisted created_at 2026-08-24 17:04:48 +08:00
image_upload.go feat(storage): add multi-instance storage backends per workspace 2026-07-15 14:54:39 +08:00
qa.go fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408) 2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
qa_attachment_test.go feat(sandbox) (#2301) 2026-08-10 21:28:20 +08:00
quick_answer_timeline.go fix(chat): 持久化快速问答的检索步骤,刷新后不再丢失时间轴 2026-08-13 21:34:21 +08:00
quick_answer_timeline_test.go fix(chat): 持久化快速问答的检索步骤,刷新后不再丢失时间轴 2026-08-13 21:34:21 +08:00
resolve_agent_test.go fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408) 2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
resource_urls.go fix(api): close the resource_urls=public gaps found in review 2026-08-05 14:42:51 +08:00
resource_urls_test.go fix(api): close the resource_urls=public gaps found in review 2026-08-05 14:42:51 +08:00
sandbox_desktop_rfb.go feat(sandbox): add a graphical desktop to session sandboxes (#3245) 2026-09-14 20:37:37 +08:00
sandbox_desktop_rfb_test.go feat(sandbox): add a graphical desktop to session sandboxes (#3245) 2026-09-14 20:37:37 +08:00
sandbox_desktop_ws.go feat(sandbox): add a graphical desktop to session sandboxes (#3245) 2026-09-14 20:37:37 +08:00
sandbox_desktop_ws_test.go feat(sandbox): add a graphical desktop to session sandboxes (#3245) 2026-09-14 20:37:37 +08:00
sandbox_terminal_bridge.go feat(sandbox): add an interactive terminal and files tab beside chat (#3110) 2026-09-08 17:43:15 +08:00
sandbox_terminal_bridge_test.go feat(sandbox): add an interactive terminal and files tab beside chat (#3110) 2026-09-08 17:43:15 +08:00
sandbox_terminal_idle_test.go feat(sandbox): unify the interactive PTY prompt and reconnect running sandboxes (#3128) 2026-09-09 18:17:10 +08:00
sandbox_terminal_ws.go feat(sandbox): unify the interactive PTY prompt and reconnect running sandboxes (#3128) 2026-09-09 18:17:10 +08:00
search_knowledge_resource_urls_test.go fix(api): address resource_urls review follow-ups 2026-08-05 14:42:51 +08:00
steer.go fix(chat): preserve steering continuity and composer focus 2026-09-09 20:15:23 +08:00
steer_delivery_test.go feat(chat): append messages to a running agent turn (#3123) 2026-09-09 16:43:33 +08:00
steer_live_run_test.go fix(chat): preserve steering continuity and composer focus 2026-09-09 20:15:23 +08:00
steer_wiring_test.go feat(chat): append messages to a running agent turn (#3123) 2026-09-09 16:43:33 +08:00
stream.go fix(api): close the resource_urls=public gaps found in review 2026-08-05 14:42:51 +08:00
stream_usage_test.go feat(agent): report and attribute per-turn LLM token usage 2026-08-24 10:36:19 +08:00
temporary_attachment_persist_test.go feat(attachments): implement normalization and limits for temporary attachment IDs 2026-07-16 17:41:27 +08:00
temporary_document.go fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings (#3416) 2026-09-18 22:58:46 +08:00
temporary_document_engine_test.go fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings (#3416) 2026-09-18 22:58:46 +08:00
title.go feat(session): implement strict owner scope for API-key sessions 2026-07-20 19:31:02 +08:00
types.go fix(agent): search bound knowledge bases before answering, and pass suggested-question origins (#3400) 2026-09-18 17:00:47 +08:00
wiki_fixer_scope.go fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408) 2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
wiki_fixer_scope_test.go fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces (#3408) 2026-09-18 22:00:02 +08:00
workspace_checkpoint_completion_test.go feat(session): fork conversations from a historical user message (#3304) 2026-09-17 14:20:18 +08:00