* fix(models): show usage details when deletion is blocked
* fix(models): open the matching agent section and cap usage lists
Agent "open configuration" now lands on the tab that owns the binding
(VLM/ASR vs follow-ups), and delete failures keep the server message when
structured details cannot be parsed. Listed KB/agent rows are capped at 50
while totals still drive the deletion guard and dialog headings.
---------
Co-authored-by: Leon <leon_hfut@foxmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
* ui(sandbox): rename settings to code sandbox and simplify cards
"Sandbox backend" leaked implementation jargon into the settings nav.
Call the page what users configure — an isolated runtime for skill
scripts — and only surface incomplete-config warnings on the cards.
* fix(sandbox): type the card overflow menu options
vue-tsc rejected pushing a themed delete item onto an untyped options
array; name the option shape so the menu still marks delete as danger.
* fix(sandbox): keep the editor wizard moving into skills
Saving on the runtime step used to close the drawer when editing, so
step 4 was only reachable from the rail. Continue after save, move
full verification off the runtime form, and stop treating "using the
base template" as the empty value for every image field.
* fix(sandbox): store skill bundles on the workspace default backend
Skill install passed a stub tenant with no default storage, so saving
the zip failed with empty provider and the 500 hid the real cause.
* ui(sandbox): regroup skill install and rename to skill sandbox
Show install vs installed groups, fold long descriptions in the list,
and call the settings surface a skill sandbox.
* ui(sandbox): show skill install transcript in a compact popup
Keep the card from growing; the run opens beside the history button
with a capped height and its own scroll.
* ui(sandbox): show installed skills on config cards
Cube/E2B tiles now list skill names so the list reads as skill sandboxes; a click opens the editor on the skills step.
* ui(sandbox): show finished skill installs as static history
A completed run already has durable messages; replaying the event log would animate the whole install again. Hide chat answer actions in this transcript.
* style(frontend): enhance compact skill timeline display with improved font sizes
Updated the CSS for the compact skill timeline to adjust font sizes for various elements, ensuring better readability in the popup interface. This includes specific adjustments for embedded agent streams and markdown content.
* ui(sandbox): refactor header structure in SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer
Updated the header structure in both SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer components to improve layout and organization. Added a new slot for extra header content in SettingDrawer and adjusted CSS for better alignment and spacing in both components.
* ui(sandbox): enhance skill loading feedback and improve deep check logic
Updated the SandboxConfigEditorDrawer to refine the logic for deep checks based on the current step. Enhanced the SkillInstallTimeline component to manage in-flight live loops and provide better feedback for skill loading failures. Adjusted the SandboxSettings view to display error messages for failed skill loads, ensuring users are informed of any issues during the skill installation process.
- Updated test files to use types.EmbedChannelContextKey instead of middleware.EmbedChannelContextKey for consistency.
- Introduced context cloning decisions for EmbedChannelContextKey to ensure proper context management during background tasks.
- Added tests to verify the correct behavior of context key declarations and their cloning decisions.
Persist extracted and explicit memories across sessions with topic
resolution, semantic recall, document affinity, consolidation, workspace
settings, and inbox/interests UI.
New endpoint GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/start — unlike /auth/oidc/url which
returns JSON and requires frontend JS to navigate, this endpoint directly
returns a 302 redirect to the OIDC Provider's authorization page. This
enables external platforms (enterprise portals, Nexus, etc.) to give a
single clickable link that triggers the full OIDC authorization code
flow and, when the IdP has an active SSO session, achieves passwordless
login without any frontend involvement.
- backend derives the callback URL from the request origin automatically
(no caller-supplied redirect_uri needed)
- OIDC nonce cookie is bound identically to /auth/oidc/url (CSRF/replay
protection)
- registered in the auth middleware public-path whitelist (otherwise
the global auth middleware returns 401 before routing reaches the
handler)
- refactored shared nonce-cookie helper out of GetOIDCAuthorizationURL
for reuse by OIDCStart
Reject invalid agent_source_tenant_id instead of silently falling back, fix a resolveAgent nil panic when a shared selector fails, and add regression tests for wiki write-tool filtering and agent resolution.
The five near-identical "c.Set + context.WithValue" blocks (JWT branch,
tenantless branch, both API-key attach helpers, EmbedAuth) now go through
one applyAuthSession helper, so the c.Keys surface and the request-context
surface can no longer drift apart. The 140-line JWT branch inside Auth is
split into authenticateJWTUser / resolveTargetTenant, which also removes a
duplicate GetTenantByID roundtrip on the X-Tenant-ID switch path.
Fixes folded in:
- delete GetTenantIDFromContext: it read ctx.Value("tenantID") while the
value is stored under types.TenantIDContextKey ("TenantID"), so it could
never succeed (dead, broken, uncalled)
- isPlatformTenantOptionalAPI: match "/api/v1/system/admin" exactly or as
a "/"-delimited prefix instead of a bare HasPrefix that would also admit
sibling paths sharing the prefix
- 401 for a presented-but-invalid Bearer token now says "invalid or
expired token" instead of the misleading "missing authentication"
- replace the remaining log.Printf calls in the auth path with the
request-scoped structured logger
New tests lock the both-surfaces invariant of applyAuthSession, the
tenantless "no tenant/role keys" contract, and bearerToken parsing.
Prevent concurrent refresh-token rotation across instances, distinguish
expired-but-refreshable tokens from active authorization, and bind OAuth
popup polling to a per-attempt ID so stale tokens cannot satisfy new consent.
Introduce platform API keys with capability-based access to tenant management,
system settings, runtime queues, and audit logs, plus admin UI for key lifecycle
and system audit log viewing.
Let tenant-wide retrieve keys serve tenant-bounded /files paths while
denying KB-restricted keys, declare knowledge batch write routes for
ingest-capable keys, and short-circuit ownership checks for API-key
principals already authorized by the gate and KB allow-list.
Align product copy, API docs, Swagger descriptions, and i18n strings
with workspace terminology while keeping internal tenant identifiers
and headers unchanged for API compatibility.
Allow platform system administrators to update builtin model parameters
and credentials from the management UI while keeping secrets masked in API
responses. UI edits clear YAML ownership so startup reconciliation no
longer overwrites runtime overrides.
Updated the logger to include regex patterns for sanitizing "new_password" and "old_password" fields in JSON logs. Added a corresponding test case to verify the sanitization functionality.
Drop the standalone OIDC_AUTH_DEFAULT_TENANT_MODE / oidc_auth.default_tenant_mode
knob so OIDC auto-provisioning and local password registration share the single
auth.default_tenant_mode policy (resolved by the callback handler). Repair
tenantless sessions by falling back to the first active membership on the login
happy path and stale-preference paths, allow tenantless PUT /auth/me/preferences,
clear the tenant snapshot on /auth/me responses without a tenant, and default the
frontend canCreateTenant capability to fail-closed until /auth/me confirms it.
Allow deployments to register users without auto-creating a personal tenant, expose creation policy via /auth/me, and guide tenantless accounts through a workspace onboarding flow.
Enforce tenant ownership in ListSharesByAgent so full-access API keys cannot enumerate cross-tenant shares, and allow full-access keys to create KBs and manage share routes consistently with other tenant-wide operations.
Eliminate the POST /tenants/{id}/api-key endpoint for resetting tenant API keys, transitioning to a more granular API key management approach. Update related documentation and API specifications to reflect the new structure, including changes to the tenant API key management paths. Adjust frontend code and internationalization files to remove references to the deprecated API key reset functionality, enhancing clarity and consistency across the application.
Change the default role for tenant API keys from 'admin' to 'owner' to align with the new authorization model. Update related tests to reflect this change, ensuring that API keys with the owner role are correctly denied access to management paths and system-admin routes. Introduce new tests to validate that API keys are properly restricted from accessing sensitive endpoints, reinforcing the security measures in place.
Add DenyAPIKeyPrincipal middleware to explicitly block API-key principals from accessing certain routes, ensuring security for endpoints outside the /api/v1 group. Introduce tests to validate that API keys are correctly denied access while allowing JWT sessions to pass through. This enhances the overall authorization model by reinforcing the default-deny approach for API keys.
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a
central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model.
- Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes
declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared
routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the
JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals.
- Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope
is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that
unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method.
- Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching.
- Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort
writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and
backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans.
- Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename
role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales.
- Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize
gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
Introduce tests to validate that tenant API keys are correctly restricted from accessing management paths. Implemented new test cases for both allowed and forbidden paths, ensuring proper enforcement of API key scopes. Additionally, refactored existing tests to utilize the new rejection logic.
Replace scopes JSON with a viewer/contributor/admin role column, move
unsafe-method authorization from path-prefix middleware to declarative
APIKey* guards on routes, and close remaining KB-scope gaps in handlers.
Use c.Request.Context() in authenticateAPIKeyRequest so scoped keys are
actually restricted, update dto tests for removed tenant.api_key, and add
a regression test for the attach-context contract.
Revoke existing keys on reset, unify scope enforcement, default empty
scopes to read-only, map API key scopes to tenant roles, and remove dead
key-generation helpers left over from the tenant api_key column removal.
Make document keyword search case-insensitive (LOWER(...) LIKE LOWER(?)) in the
list filter and SearchKnowledge / SearchKnowledgeInScopes paths so a query and
its differently-cased variant return the same results.
Classify not-found consistently as HTTP 404 (not 500) so clients read a
permanent resource.not_found instead of a retryable 5xx: map the document /
chunk not-found sentinels in the KB-access middleware (typed ErrChunkNotFound
via errors.Is), and return 404 for a missing message on the continue-stream and
message-delete endpoints.
Support connecting to MCP servers that require OAuth2, with a Cursor-like
zero-config flow: the user provides only a URL and the system performs
metadata discovery, dynamic client registration (DCR), and the
authorization code flow with PKCE on first connect.
- Persist per-user access/refresh tokens and per-service DCR client
credentials, encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- Store the PKCE verifier/state during the flow via Redis with an
in-memory fallback for Lite mode
- Cache MCP clients per (service, user) so tokens stay user-isolated
- Add endpoints for authorize-url, callback, status, and token revoke;
the callback is allowlisted for unauthenticated access
- Surface a structured "authorization required" hint when a tool call
hits an unauthorized MCP service
- Frontend: add an auth-type selector with OAuth config, inline
authorization status/actions, and render the connection test result
inline in the editor drawer instead of a stacked centered dialog
Introduce embed_channels storage, publish-token and session-token auth,
origin allowlist enforcement, shared Redis rate limiter, public embed API
routes, webhooks with SSRF validation, and session listing by embed source.
This commit removes Jaeger tracing support from the project, including the associated Docker configurations, Go modules, and middleware. The changes simplify the codebase by eliminating unused tracing functionality, which was previously integrated for observability. Documentation and scripts have also been updated to reflect the removal of Jaeger references.
The global Auth middleware allowlist (noAuthAPI) was missing the
share-link routes, so an unauthenticated invitee opening /register?token=
hit a 401 on /auth/invitations/lookup and the frontend bounced them to
/login instead of showing the register page. Add both share-link
endpoints to the allowlist and stop the request interceptor from treating
their 401s as a session-expiry redirect.
Refs: https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/issues/1617
Several failure modes left Knowledge.parse_status pinned at "processing"
forever, with no signal to users beyond a permanent spinner. This commit
addresses the root causes and adds a safety net.
- Asynq worker pool: explicit Concurrency (default 16, env-tunable via
WEKNORA_ASYNQ_CONCURRENCY) so batch uploads don't queue behind a
CPU-count-sized worker pool. Redis op timeouts raised to 500ms/1000ms
(WEKNORA_REDIS_OP_TIMEOUT_MS) to absorb bursty multimodal counter ops.
- DocReader RPC: cap each call with WEKNORA_DOCREADER_CALL_TIMEOUT
(default 30m). Without this, a hung docreader pinned a worker for the
full DocumentProcessTimeout window.
- ImageMultimodal: finalize-on-last-attempt semantics. A permanently
failing single image no longer strands the parent — the asynq retry
is allowed to run, but on the final attempt we count the image
regardless of outcome. Redis DECR errors fall back to enqueuing the
post-process task instead of returning silently.
- Dead-letter callback: when DocumentProcess / KnowledgePostProcess /
ManualProcess exhausts retries, immediately mark the corresponding
Knowledge as failed with the last error. This surfaces the failure
in the UI without waiting for the housekeeping sweep.
- HousekeepingService: 5-minute cron that flips knowledge rows stuck
in "processing" past DocumentProcessTimeout + 10m to failed, plus
summary rows stuck > 1h. Catches anything the other safety nets
miss (worker SIGKILL mid-handler, etc.). Disable with
WEKNORA_HOUSEKEEPING_ENABLED=false.
- Distributed startup recovery: previously the post-restart sweep was
skipped whenever REDIS_ADDR was set, even though Asynq does not
reschedule the task that was actively running on the dead instance.
Now the sweep runs in distributed mode too, but only against rows
older than 30 minutes to avoid racing peer instances.
When IM image rendering breaks, operators previously had no log line to
correlate against the IM platform's fetch attempt. Add observability
hooks on both ends and unblock HEAD probes so common IM previews work
at all.
- log rewriteStorageURLs success/failure/no-op with the full signed URL
(operators can copy it from logs and verify public reachability)
- log presigned handler 4xx with client_ip + UA + tenant_id + file_path
so failures correlate against IM platform fetch logs; use the request
context so trace IDs are preserved
- accept HEAD on /api/v1/files/presigned: IM platforms (Feishu, Slack
etc.) probe with HEAD before GET when rendering image previews, and a
401 there is enough to break the inline image even when the GET would
have succeeded
- add Admin-only GET /api/v1/files/presigned-preview that returns the
exact URL an IM channel would embed for the calling tenant, for
self-service verification without sending a real IM message
- clarify APP_EXTERNAL_URL and MINIO_ENDPOINT public-reachability rules
in .env.example; misconfigured endpoints are the most common cause of
"image broken in IM" reports
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode
When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.
This change introduces a share-link model:
- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread
Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.
Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.
Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.
* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting
- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
Replace the standalone /platform/system/* routes with a single
"系统设置" section inside the canonical Settings modal. The previous
SystemLayout.vue / SystemAdmins.vue surfaces are removed and their
functionality (system admin roster, global settings) is hosted directly
in SystemSettings.vue under the standard `.section-header` /
`.settings-group` skeleton. Legacy URLs redirect to the modal section
so external bookmarks don't 404.
Backend:
- SystemSettingService.Reset + repo.Delete: drop the DB override for a
key so the 3-tier resolver falls back to ENV / built-in default.
Idempotent (resetting a never-persisted key returns nil); emits an
audit row only on real deletions, invalidates the local cache, and
publishes to peers via the existing pubsub channel.
- TenantService.BulkSetStorageQuota: overwrite every tenant's
storage_quota in one statement. Powers POST /system/admin/tenants/
apply-default-storage-quota; bypasses the per-tenant whitelist on
PUT /tenants/:id which intentionally forbids storage_quota edits.
- AuditAction{SystemAdminPromoted,SystemAdminRevoked} constants and
emitAdminAudit() in SystemHandler — promote / revoke now leave an
audit trail with TenantID=0 and {target_email,target_username,
idempotent|changed} in details.
- SystemSetting.LastModifiedByName: derived per-request display label
(username, email fallback) so the UI shows "wizardchen" instead of
a UUID prefix without storing a denormalised column.
Frontend:
- SystemSettings.vue rewritten against the Settings modal skeleton with
auto-persisting controls (switch/select @change, input/inputnumber
@blur, tag-input + per-delta popconfirm for SSRF whitelist and admin
roster). auth.registration_mode change goes through an inline
popconfirm; cancel rolls back. Reset / bulk-apply also inline
popconfirms — no dialog modal for these per-row affordances.
- Priority hint panel surfaces the DB > ENV > default resolver order
so operators can reason about "I set the env but it doesn't show up".
- Router: /platform/system, /platform/system/settings, /platform/system/
admins are now compatibility redirects to /platform/settings?section=
system-global.
- Settings modal sized 900x700 → 1080x780 and content-wrapper 600 → 760
so the wider tables (members, system settings) breathe; <1100px
viewport still flexes to the screen.
- i18n: system.globalSettings.* keys for title / description / loading /
empty / badges / priority hint / per-key labels / reset / bulkApply /
admins (label, placeholder, save messages, popconfirm copy) across
zh-CN, en-US, ko-KR, ru-RU.
Misc:
- internal/utils/filesize.go doc: clarify MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB is a
deploy-time-only knob (nginx + docreader + frontend each cache the
env at startup); a SystemAdmin UI override would mislead operators
because nginx would still 413. Until all four layers can hot-reload
the limit in lockstep, this stays env-only.
- internal/utils/security.go: SSRF whitelist parser/runtime now drives
off SystemSettingService for live updates; ENV remains the fallback
for never-overridden deployments.
- Added RevokeSystemAdmin functionality to the user service and repository, ensuring atomic checks for self-revoke and last admin scenarios.
- Updated the system handler to utilize the new revocation method, improving error handling for various edge cases.
- Enhanced the bootstrap process to prevent unintended promotions when system admins already exist.
- Refactored related comments and documentation for clarity on the new behavior and safeguards in place.
- Added WEKNORA_BOOTSTRAP_SYSTEM_ADMIN_EMAIL environment variable to promote a specified user to system admin on startup.
- Introduced a new bootstrap process in `bootstrap.go` to handle the promotion logic.
- Updated `.env.example` to document the new environment variable and its behavior.
- Created new views for managing system administrators and system settings, including listing, promoting, and revoking admin privileges.
- Enhanced the frontend to reflect the new system admin features, including UI elements for admin management and settings configuration.
- Updated API interfaces to support system admin functionalities, ensuring proper data handling and user management.
Refactor the tenant RBAC configuration to change the default value from false to true, enabling role enforcement by default. This change allows operators to opt into a logging-only rollout window by explicitly setting the configuration to false.
Updates include:
- Modifications to .env.example and docker-compose.yml to reflect the new default.
- Adjustments in rbac.md documentation to clarify the new default behavior and the opt-in process.
- Code changes across various files to utilize the new pointer-based configuration for EnableRBAC, ensuring nil safety and clearer intent.
No functional changes were introduced; the adjustments primarily enhance clarity and maintainability of the RBAC feature.
Updated the AuditLogRetentionRunner to include a 'started' flag, allowing Stop() to return immediately if Start() was never invoked. This change prevents potential deadlocks during graceful shutdown. Additionally, added tests to ensure that Stop() behaves correctly when called before Start() and when the service is nil.
Refs: #1303
Added functionality for managing pending invitations, including a polling mechanism to update the invitation count in real-time. Introduced a new dialog component for users to view and respond to their invitations without navigating away from their current context. Updated API endpoints for fetching and managing invitations, and enhanced the user interface with relevant internationalization support.
Refs: #1303
Follow-up to the route-level KB-access guard introduced earlier in
this PR. Five reviewer findings, all fixed in middleware + tests
without changing handler call sites:
- Honour `?agent_id` in the agent-share fallback. The in-handler
resolution in knowledgebase.go branches on a specific agent's
KBSelectionMode (all / selected / none); the guard was only ever
calling TenantCanAccessKBViaSomeSharedAgent, which let some
requests pass at the guard layer that the handler would then
reject — and rewrote the request's tenant context to the source
tenant before the rejection happened. The guard now mirrors the
handler: a specific agent_id pins the resolution to that agent
(no fallback to any-agent), an empty agent_id keeps the existing
any-agent behaviour. The knowledge.go / knowledgebase.go handler
helpers stay in place as defence in depth until they're folded
into the guard in a follow-up.
- Distinguish not-found vs. transient on the knowledge / chunk
resolvers. A DB hiccup used to surface as a 404, both confusing
clients and hiding the underlying failure from monitoring. The
resolvers now return apperror 404 only for the known not-found
sentinels (apprepo.ErrKnowledgeBaseNotFound, ErrResourceNotFound)
and let other errors propagate; the guard maps those to a fresh
NewServiceUnavailableError (503).
- Stop 500-ing on legacy chunks with empty knowledge_base_id. The
chunk is effectively unresolvable to a KB, so the client gets the
same 404 they'd get for a missing chunk instead of a 500 that
pollutes alerting. The warn log preserves the operator signal.
- Honour cfg.Tenant.EnableRBAC. The guard now mirrors RequireRole /
RequireOwnershipOrRole: with enforcement off, 401/403 paths log
the would-be rejection and pass through. 404 still fires either
way (a missing resource is not an authorisation event). Keeps the
rollout window safe — operators can flip enforcement on globally
without code changes elsewhere.
- Document the c.Keys vs. c.Request.Context() split. The guard
intentionally rewrites only the request context (handlers that
still run their own share resolution, currently knowledge.go /
knowledgebase.go, would otherwise see kb.TenantID == c.Keys
tenant and misclassify shared-Viewer access as Admin). The
package-level comment now spells this out so the migration of the
remaining handlers in a follow-up doesn't accidentally regress
`my_permission` rendering.
Tests:
- Existing four cases keep working; runGuard signature gained a
guardOpts knob.
- Eight new cases cover the agent-share resolution paths (any-agent
viewer, Editor required → must reject, specific agent in modes
all / selected-match / selected-miss / none, cross-tenant
mismatch) plus the EnableRBAC=false fail-open + 404-still-fires
pair.
Follow-up to the FAQ + Tag refactor in this same PR. Three additional
handler areas now run through the route-level g.KBAccess* guard:
- chunk.go : full refactor — helper effectiveCtxForKnowledge and
validateAndGetChunk's access check are gone; the
handler's chunk-fetch + ownership-mismatch check stay
as defence-in-depth (a same-tenant attacker can't
pass mismatched knowledge_id + chunk_id).
- knowledge.go and knowledgebase.go : routes now run the guard
BEFORE the handler. The in-handler
validateKnowledgeBaseAccess /
resolveKnowledgeAndValidateKBAccess helpers stay for
now because they branch on the agent_id query param
(specific-agent check vs. any-agent fallback) — that
handler-specific branch can collapse into the guard
in a follow-up. The duplicated DB roundtrip is
negligible compared to the handler's main work.
New middleware exports:
- KBIDFromChunkIDParam : walks chunk_id → KnowledgeBaseID via the
chunk's denormalised column.
- g.KBAccessReadFromChunkIDParam / g.KBAccessWriteFromChunkIDParam
: convenience methods on rbacGuards.
Route changes are purely additive (existing role / ownership guards
stay in place; the new KB-access guard runs after them and rewrites
the request's tenant context to the source tenant for shared KBs).
No new dependencies on the kbShareService / agentShareService at the
handler level for chunk.go — those move to the route layer.
Tests pass; behaviour unchanged.