Reverts the eleven plugin system PRs merged on 2026-09-26 so they can be
reviewed before landing:
* a829d7cc9 agent tools served by plugins (#3733)
* 4f5d475c3 Jira example plugin (#3730)
* 01222aac8 dynamic form options, OAuth connections and resource limits (#3729)
* cf502ba46 event delivery and webhooks (#3728)
* 996696057 sandboxed plugin pages (#3727)
* da4ef68d9 standalone plugin hosts (#3725)
* 728007ada remote runtime, Python SDK (#3724)
* ff49f9491 Host API and document parsers (#3721)
* 4328ab26a code plugins (#3720)
* ed63e35cc declarative plugins (#3716)
* c91a8d11f plugin system foundation (#3711)
The tree is back to 47773b5bd, migrations included: no environment ran
the plugin migrations (versioned 000115-000119, sqlite 000034-000038).
* feat(plugin): install declarative plugin packages across nodes
* feat(plugin): serve installed plugins' MCP servers in each workspace
* feat(plugin): let installed plugins contribute skills and model vendors
* feat(plugin): register plugin skills into the workspace skill catalog
* feat(frontend): manage installed plugins and their configuration
* test(weaviate): read the class state before the probe barrier
* fix(plugin): keep MCP tool directories reachable behind the plugin wrapper
* test(plugin): wrap a long line
* fix(agent): scope the @Skill and @MCP pickers to the agent that will run
Both pickers listed the caller's own workspace, but a shared agent invokes its
OWNER's skills and MCP services. The two never line up, so for every shared
agent:
* @Skill was always empty, in every skills mode. GET /skills resolves the
sandbox config with (tenant, id), and the agent's config id does not exist
in the borrower's workspace - effectiveTenantSkills short-circuits before
it reads a single skill row. The response still reported
skills_available: true, so the category appeared with nothing under it.
* @MCP in "selected" mode was empty for the same reason: the preset holds the
owner's service ids, which match nothing in the borrower's catalog.
* @MCP in "all" mode was worse than empty. isMCPAllowedByAgent returns true
for every enabled service, so the picker offered the BORROWER's own
services; resolvePerRequestMCPScope then intersected the mention against
the agent's preset, found nothing, and dropped it with only a warning.
Resolve the agent when the request carries agent_id + agent_source_tenant_id
and read its resources where they live. Only an explicit source workspace takes
the share path, so an own-agent request is byte-for-byte unchanged; built-in
agent ids exist in every workspace, and falling back to a share lookup without
one would let an org member take over the caller's default agent, exactly as
session.Handler.resolveAgent already documents.
Both endpoints serve only what the agent can actually invoke:
* skills: the sandbox config comes from the agent, never from the query, so a
borrower cannot name another config in the owner's workspace and enumerate
it; "selected" narrows to the configured names and a disabled picker never
reaches the owner's inventory at all.
* MCP: the agent's explicit preset and nothing else, because that is exactly
what resolvePerRequestMCPScope accepts for a shared agent. "all" therefore
offers nothing rather than offering services every mention would drop.
Whether "all" should become mentionable is a separate decision about that
guard, not about the picker.
The cross-workspace MCP rows use a narrowed response built field by field.
NewMCPServiceResponse reveals endpoint URL, headers, env vars and stdio command
to an Admin, and a borrower can be an Admin of their own workspace - that shape
must be narrow by construction, not by role.
On the client the two lists now follow the selected agent: their cache keys
carry it, and the chat input refetches on a switch behind a request token, so a
slow response for the agent the user just left cannot overwrite the picker with
another workspace's services.
* fix(agent): check the c.Error return on the shared-agent picker paths
golangci-lint judges pull requests on the lines they introduce, so the
repository's older bare c.Error calls are grandfathered while these three are
not. Match the _ = c.Error form already used in mcp_service.go.
* feat(mcp)!: persist tool catalogs and add guided configuration
* fix(mcp): write caller-owned catalogs and require a real tool sync
OAuth viewers can now persist their own directory, and the setup wizard no longer treats an unsynced service as complete. Missing catalogs auto-fetch on the tools step; already-used MCP functions are restored across engine turns.
* fix(mcp): skip redundant list_servers and tighten catalog UI
When the advertised server directory already fits in discover_mcp_tools, models should list_tools or describe directly. Chat and settings now show server names, collapsed docs, and initialize debug metadata for empty optional fields.
* fix(mcp): surface catalog summaries and polish tool detail UI
List responses now include a saved catalog count without live MCP calls, so settings cards and @ mentions can show sync state. Tool details open in a popup instead of expanding the row.
* fix(mcp): drop incomplete Anthropic calls and gate shared catalog refresh
Unclosed streamed tool_use was emitted as {} and executed. list_tools refresh=true now re-lists upstream instead of returning the saved snapshot, and only Admin (or MCP-capable API keys) can overwrite tenant-wide static-auth catalogs.
* fix(mcp): wrap client refresh path to satisfy lll
The metadata refresh URL made doRequest exceed the 120-character limit in the client module CI lint.
Refuse truncated tool calls, compact-and-retry once on overflow, and let
sandbox files be appended, paged, and batch-edited instead of rewritten.
Models can set context_window (default 200K) so compaction sizes itself
from the real window; agent max_iterations of -1 means unlimited.
Persist extracted and explicit memories across sessions with topic
resolution, semantic recall, document affinity, consolidation, workspace
settings, and inbox/interests UI.
Allow platform system administrators to update builtin model parameters
and credentials from the management UI while keeping secrets masked in API
responses. UI edits clear YAML ownership so startup reconciliation no
longer overwrites runtime overrides.
Introduce a new `max_concurrency` parameter to the model configuration, allowing control over the maximum number of concurrent background tasks (ingestion/enrichment) per model. This feature is applicable to chat, embedding, and VLM models, with a value of 0 or undefined falling back to the global default. Update UI components and localization files to support this new setting, ensuring a seamless user experience.
Introduce unit tests for the tenant API key validation logic, ensuring that scoped keys require capabilities, while full-access keys are validated without them. The tests cover various scenarios, reinforcing the expected behavior of the API key validation function.
Use c.Request.Context() in authenticateAPIKeyRequest so scoped keys are
actually restricted, update dto tests for removed tenant.api_key, and add
a regression test for the attach-context contract.
Strip model base URLs from viewer-accessible initialization config
responses and merge redacted parser secrets before engine check overrides
so admin test flows keep working after masked GET responses.
Apply the same tenant/integration secret policy to auth login, OIDC
callback, switch-tenant, and invite-register payloads, and return masked
config objects from Admin-only tenant KV PUT handlers.
Prevent low-privileged tenant members from reading raw API keys and
infrastructure credentials via tenant profile, KV config, model/MCP/web
search listings, and KB initialization config responses.
Select the auth header for the configured strategy only, instead of
emitting both X-API-Key and Authorization whenever the fields happened
to be set (which double-authed after switching strategies). AuthType=""
keeps the legacy infer-from-fields behavior for pre-existing rows.
Add a configurable api_key_header (non-secret, defaults to X-API-Key) so
services expecting the key in a different header work without plaintext
custom headers.
On connection test, upgrade a bare 401 that advertises RFC 9728
protected-resource metadata into an explicit OAuthRequired signal so the
UI can guide the user to switch to OAuth 2.0. Surface the server's
description from the initialize handshake in the test result.
Scope auth headers to feed fetches, use feed-scoped external IDs and
content-based incremental fingerprints, tolerate partial feed failures,
store feed URLs in settings, and fix credential configured detection.
Support connecting to MCP servers that require OAuth2, with a Cursor-like
zero-config flow: the user provides only a URL and the system performs
metadata discovery, dynamic client registration (DCR), and the
authorization code flow with PKCE on first connect.
- Persist per-user access/refresh tokens and per-service DCR client
credentials, encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- Store the PKCE verifier/state during the flow via Redis with an
in-memory fallback for Lite mode
- Cache MCP clients per (service, user) so tokens stay user-isolated
- Add endpoints for authorize-url, callback, status, and token revoke;
the callback is allowlisted for unauthenticated access
- Surface a structured "authorization required" hint when a tool call
hits an unauthorized MCP service
- Frontend: add an auth-type selector with OAuth config, inline
authorization status/actions, and render the connection test result
inline in the editor drawer instead of a stacked centered dialog
Replace the legacy "redacted placeholder + Clear* boolean" pattern with
dedicated per-resource credential subresources across MCP services,
Models, Web search providers, and Data sources.
Why
---
The previous design had three problems:
1. Main PUT body carried secret fields. The frontend echoed back a
redacted "***" placeholder, and a fragile MergeUpdate / IsRedactedOrEmpty
defense in the service layer tried to detect "user did not change this"
vs "user wants to clear this". A regression in that defense (or a new
frontend forgetting it) silently overwrites the stored secret with the
placeholder.
2. The "remove this credential" UX was a red checkbox under a pre-filled
password input. Three intents (preserve / replace / clear) collapsed
onto one field, and credential changes were bundled with unrelated
config edits in the same submit. Users wiped working keys by mistake.
3. Secret presence was inferred from "did the response come back with a
'***' placeholder", which couples the contract to a magic string.
Design
------
Each of the four resources now exposes:
PUT /{resource}/{id}/credentials # write one or more fields
DELETE /{resource}/{id}/credentials/{field} # clear a single field
"Is this configured?" metadata travels on the main resource response as
a typed map (dto.MCPServiceResponse.Credentials etc.) — no separate GET
endpoint. The frontend reads the configured boolean from the main GET
and never sees secret values at all.
Main PUT endpoints now ignore any secret fields in the request body and
log a deprecation warning if they appear, so legacy clients fail loudly
rather than overwriting silently.
Frontend
--------
- New reusable <CredentialResource> component renders a three-state card
(unconfigured / configured / editing) and drives the dedicated
endpoints. Used by MCP, Model, Web search; DataSource has a bespoke
card with the same behaviour because its credentials are a single
atomic per-connector map.
- Cancel from edit mode now restores state synchronously from the meta
prop. The previous async refresh() was a no-op while state was still
'editing', leaving the input frozen open.
- Remove is single-click + toast. The danger-themed button is the
deterrent; a modal confirm adds friction without adding safety (the
plaintext is irrecoverable client-side either way — recovery means
re-typing).
DTOs (internal/handler/dto/) are deliberately separate from the GORM
models so "no secret in response" is a compile-time invariant: a future
contributor cannot leak a secret without explicitly adding the field to
the DTO, which is review-able in a single diff.
Storage is unchanged — credentials still live in the existing jsonb /
parameters columns. No schema migration.
Cleanup
-------
- types.MCPService / types.Model / types.WebSearchProviderEntity /
types.DataSourceConfig: drop ClearAPIKey / ClearToken / ClearAppSecret
/ ClearCredentials boolean fields, MergeUpdate(), RedactSensitiveData().
- utils/types/secret.go: drop PreserveIfRedacted / IsRedactedOrEmpty.
RedactedSecretPlaceholder constant is retained because VectorStore
still uses the old pattern and is out of scope here.
- Frontend hasExistingApiKey / clearApiKey / convertToLegacyFormat
redaction handling removed; i18n keys renamed secret -> credential.