* feat(security): add a whitelist-only outbound mode that refuses before DNS
A penetration test of a private deployment found that a host outside
SSRF_WHITELIST still produces a DNS query: every outbound guard resolves
the name first and judges the addresses afterwards, which is what makes
it immune to DNS rebinding, but it also means an attacker-chosen name
reaches the resolver and can carry data out of an otherwise offline
network (#3378).
SSRF_DNS_WHITELIST_ONLY makes the whitelist the whole egress policy, and
the check is placed wherever a name is still in hand.
Where a URL is available, CheckSSRFWhitelistOnly refuses a host the
whitelist does not name, IP literals included: URL validation, the
sandbox outbound policy, and the web-fetch target resolver.
Where only a dial address is available, CheckDialWhitelistOnly judges
hostnames and leaves addresses to the checks that already exist, because
an IP arriving at a dialer is either a name something else resolved or a
literal the URL layer already refused. That covers the shared SSRF-safe
dialer, the web-fetch dialer, the Yunzhijia webhook dialer, and every
sandbox transport: the HTTP and websocket data planes, the guarded
transport and the Docker engine now share one GuardedDialContext instead
of each building its own dialer.
Where the client resolves its own target, the name is judged before the
client exists. gRPC's resolver runs before any dialer it was given, so
the env-configured qdrant and milvus clients are built through small
constructors that refuse a non-whitelisted host outright; a whitelisted
one is resolved by gRPC as before.
docreader enforces the same switch in its own validator, and compose
passes the variable to both services.
Matching is by name only in this mode: the whitelist's CIDR entries
still match an IP literal, but a hostname is no longer resolved to see
whether its addresses fall inside one, because that lookup is the query
the mode exists to prevent.
The value is parsed with ParseBool, and a non-empty value that parses as
neither enables the mode: silently leaving an egress lockdown off
because an operator wrote "yes" is the one failure mode a security
control must not have.
Still not covered, and documented as such: the Langfuse OTLP exporter
builds its own client and never reaches these guards; and with
HTTP(S)_PROXY set the proxy host is dialled unguarded when the dial
address equals the proxy URL's host exactly, while a mismatch makes the
proxy host itself subject to the whitelist.
The switch defaults to off, so nothing changes for deployments that do
not set it.
* docs(security): document SSRF_DNS_WHITELIST_ONLY in website-docs
docs/ has been retired in favour of website-docs/ (#3580), so the notes that
lived in docs/QA.md move to the configuration table: the new switch, what to
whitelist before turning it on, and the three outbound paths it still does
not cover.
The existing SSRF_WHITELIST row was also stale: compose gives only the app its
SSRF_WHITELIST_EXTRA default (which now includes minio), and docreader's is
empty, so "shared by app and docreader" held for SSRF_WHITELIST alone.
encode_image documents errors="ignore" as "return empty bytes on decoding
errors", but it only catches binascii.Error. base64.b64decode raises that for
bad padding or a bad alphabet; for a str that is not pure ASCII it fails in
_bytes_from_decode_data first and raises a plain ValueError, which escapes.
The one caller that passes errors="ignore" is the markdown base64-image
extractor, whose payload group is `([^\)]+)` — everything up to the closing
paren, not the base64 alphabet. A CJK image title therefore lands inside the
payload:

^^^^ captured as base64
MarkdownImageBase64.parse_into_text does not catch, PipelineParser does not
catch, and BaseParser.parse does not catch, so the ValueError reaches the gRPC
handler and the whole document comes back as
ReadResponse(error="string argument should contain only ASCII characters").
One image title fails the entire upload, and the message names nothing the
user can act on.
The same title written in ASCII decodes fine, because b64decode with
validate=False discards the quotes and spaces. The failure only shows up for
titles in the languages this project is mostly used in.
Catching ValueError covers both cases — binascii.Error subclasses it — so the
undecodable image is skipped and logged, which is what the extractor's own
`if not image_byte` branch already expects to happen.
Not addressed here: the pattern swallowing the title is a separate bug, and
narrowing that group changes which markdown the extractor matches. Filed as
its own change rather than folded in.
* fix: remove temp file when TempFileContext write fails inside __enter__
TempFileContext.__enter__ creates a NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) and then
calls write()/flush() with no error handling. If either raises (ENOSPC, quota,
any I/O error), the exception escapes __enter__, and Python's with-statement
never calls __exit__ for a context manager whose __enter__ failed. __exit__ is
the only place the file is closed and removed, so the file leaks permanently;
delete=False means GC will not remove it either.
doc_parser.py uses this to spill every uploaded .doc's full bytes to disk, so
one disk-pressure event leaves the whole document behind and makes the
pressure worse.
Wrap write/flush in try/except, close and remove the file, then re-raise.
Success path and the exception-inside-body path are unchanged.
Adds docreader/tests/test_tempfile_context.py covering the failure-injection
case (fails on the old code), the normal roundtrip, and body exceptions.
* fix: unlink temp file even if close() re-raises after ENOSPC
close() flushes again, so the ENOSPC path can skip os.remove and still leak.
Share one cleanup helper that always unlinks and preserves the original error.
---------
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
Keep one classifier for address kinds so user-fetch SSRF and sandbox
control-plane checks cannot disagree, and refuse IPv6 encodings that
embed link-local or other never-routable targets.
* fix(security): harden outbound URL SSRF protection
* test(security): add SSRF validation tests for outbound URL caching
Introduce tests for outbound SSRF validation cache to ensure proper handling of URL validation, including cache reuse for the same origin, cache invalidation on whitelist changes, and expiration of cached entries. This enhances the robustness of SSRF protection mechanisms in the application.
* refactor: clean up whitespace in engine_factory.go and ssrf_outbound_cache.go
Removed unnecessary blank lines in engine_factory.go and adjusted variable declarations for consistency in ssrf_outbound_cache.go. This improves code readability without altering functionality.
Use the SSRF-safe HTTP client for file_url downloads and add redirect-aware
guards to the docreader Playwright path, closing GHSA-44fp, GHSA-rv6v, and
GHSA-c7m6.
- Add docstrings and inline comments for key functions and complex logic
- Unify comment style, eliminate magic numbers and ambiguous variable names
- No functional changes, only improve maintainability