* fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings
Verified and fixed from the shared-space permission review:
- Embed channels kept knowledge_ids, tag_ids, mentioned_items, skill_names
and summary_model_id from anonymous visitors. Mentions are only scoped
for shared agents, so a visitor could query any KB (and pick any model)
of the channel workspace by ID. The payload now drops them; the widget
never sends them.
- PUT /knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki/issues/:issue_id/status updated any issue
by ID. The update is now scoped to the path's KB (404 otherwise).
- A direct org invite let the inviter attach any user of the target
workspace (or any user by ID) as its representative, whose username and
email the roster then showed to all members. Direct adds attach no
representative, and the roster returns emails only for the caller's own
workspace.
- COS and KS3 dropped the bucket (and COS the region) segment when turning
a path into an object key, while the tenant check scans every segment:
cos://42/<region>/prefix/7/... passed as tenant 42 and read tenant 7's
object from a shared bucket. Both must now match the service's config.
- Shared agent listings returned the full agent to receivers. Prompts and
the creator's user ID are withheld; capabilities and scope stay visible.
- Temporary document uploads let the caller pick the parser engine (and
its credentials) of a shared agent's workspace; only the agent's rules
choose one there now.
- Suggested questions used request / message-snapshot knowledge_ids
without a permission check. Each document is now resolved to its KB and
checked like KB IDs, including a shared agent's scope.
- IM channels accepted any knowledge_base_id (and any agent ID on create).
Both must belong to the channel's workspace, the KB also to a restricted
API key's allow-list.
- KB-restricted API keys could list org-shared KBs outside their allow-list
in the organization views; those listings are now filtered.
- With enable_rbac=false, RequireKBAccess let cross-workspace denials
through. That switch is for roles inside a workspace; the guard now
always denies another workspace's KB, since handlers behind it load by
ID without a tenant filter.
- The org member limit was counted before and enforced apart from the
insert; it is now checked in the insert's transaction with the
organization row locked (SQLite serializes writers instead).
- The UpdateOrganization route comment and API doc said owner-only; the
service and UI allow org admins. Comment and doc corrected.
Documented, not changed: issued /r/ and presigned links stay valid until
they expire after a share is revoked.
* fix(security): address review of the low-severity shared-space fixes
- Embed payloads also drop question_origin. It selects a KB like an
@mention for agents that retrieve only when mentioned, and the widget
never sends it; the selection stays inside the agent's scope, but an
anonymous visitor should not pick among its KBs. suggestion_attribution is
kept (the widget sends it and it is validated).
- The receiver view of a shared agent also withholds the follow-up
suggestion instruction, a prompt like the others. Starter questions are
shown to receivers anyway, and the sharer's name is displayed by design.
- Follow-up suggestion generation moves into the agent's workspace with
types.WithExecutionTenant instead of a bare tenant rewrite, so the
caller is pinned before the document permission check runs. The auth
middleware and the shared run already pinned it; this removes the
dependency on that.
- KS3 CopyFile copies only from the service's own bucket (as COS and S3
do); another bucket's path is a cross-backend copy.
Tests cover the dropped question_origin, the follow-up instruction and the
/shared-agents listing, a follow-up context with the tenant switched, a
repeated wiki issue status update, and the KS3 copy source.
* fix(security): close cross-workspace access paths in shared spaces
A review of how shared-space (organization) members reach each other's
resources found six paths that bypass the org-share permission model:
- presigned-preview signed any resource handle or storage path, turning a
known resource:// handle into an anonymous /r/ URL that outlives share
revocation. It now requires the path to belong to the caller's tenant,
like /files.
- POST /initialization/initialize let a shared-KB editor rewrite the owner
workspace's models (base URL, API key) in place. Only the KB's own
workspace may call it, and rewriting a stored model needs the same
authority as PUT /models/:id.
- KB JSON carried the legacy inline credentials (storage_config
secret_id/secret_key, which initialization fills with the MinIO env
keys, and vlm_config api_key) to every share receiver. They are withheld
from JSON; their DB columns are unchanged.
- A chat without agent_source_tenant_id resolved shares before the
caller's own agent, so a member sharing a same-ID built-in agent took
over other workspaces' default agent. Own agents now win, built-in
agents can no longer be shared (existing such shares no longer resolve),
and embed channels drop a visitor-supplied source workspace.
- Any org-admin tenant (even a tenant Viewer inside it) could raise another
workspace's KB share to editor/admin, and the route guard was bypassable
via an unrelated :id. Share management is now: the sharer from the source
tenant (Contributor+), source-tenant Admin+, or an org-admin tenant's
Admin+ that may only remove or lower. share_id must belong to :id.
- Wiki write tools were registered for every wiki KB in the search targets,
which only need read access, so a viewer share (e.g. via the built-in
wiki fixer) could edit or delete another workspace's wiki pages. They now
act only on KBs the caller may edit.
* fix(security): close the KB settings path and owner details for share receivers
Follow-up to the shared-space review:
- PUT /initialization/config shares the route guard that admits share
editors, so an editor could still rebind the owner's KB models, chunking
and storage, and storage backends resolved against the caller's workspace
let it bind the owner's KB to its own backend. Another workspace now needs
an admin share (the only share level the frontend offers settings to) and
may not change the storage binding at all.
- GET /initialization/config showed model base URLs and bucket locations to
any admin of the caller's own workspace, including share receivers. They
now only see whether credentials are configured.
- Wiki write tools on the caller's own KBs had no role floor, so a tenant
Viewer (and the IM, embed and MCP endpoint principals that run as Viewer)
could write through an agent what the HTTP routes deny. Writes now need
Contributor+, or the ingest capability for a scoped API key, following
the RBAC rollout switch.
- resolveAgent logs the share lookup error instead of a nil own-agent error
when a shared selector fails.
* fix(security): close the medium shared-space access findings
Follow-up to the high-risk fixes, from the same review:
- Wiki fixer moved into a shared KB's workspace ran with the caller's own
config there: an unset MCP mode registered all of the owner's MCP
services, and an "all" KB scope reached the owner's other KBs. The scoped
run now uses the built-in config pinned to that one KB, without MCP,
skills, sandbox or web search, and falls back to the KB's own model.
- An unset MCP mode means "all" at runtime but is shown as none in the share
scope; shared runs now treat it as none.
- Quick-answer mode used the request's web_search_enabled alone, so a
receiver could turn on search the agent disables and spend the owner's
provider quota. It now requires the agent setting too, as agent mode does.
- summary_model_id picked any model of the workspace a run executes in. It
is ignored for shared agents and the relocated wiki fixer.
- A workspace that left or was removed from an organization kept sharing its
KBs and agents. Its shares are revoked on departure, and share queries and
permission checks require the source workspace's membership and a live
organization, which also covers rows left behind earlier.
- Sharing an agent exposes its KB scope to all members, so a Contributor
could share colleagues' KBs (or "all") through an agent. The sharer must
now be able to share each KB directly (creator or Admin+; "all" needs
Admin+), also when a shared agent's scope is widened later.
- A scoped API key with manage_channels could mint an MCP endpoint token
wider than itself. Endpoints it creates, updates or rotates must stay
within its KB allow-list and capabilities.
- A shared agent's run indexed the receiver's Q&A into the owner's chat
history KB; indexing now uses the session owner's configuration.
- Sharing an agent with skills keeps injecting the owner's skill
environment values (product decision); the share panel now warns that
members can read them. Preview of originals through read-only shares is
kept as designed and documented.
Add functionality to normalize temporary attachment IDs, ensuring deduplication and enforcing a maximum limit of 5 attachments per message. Update related handlers and tests to support this new behavior, enhancing the robustness of attachment management in chat sessions.
Eliminate the POST /tenants/{id}/api-key endpoint for resetting tenant API keys, transitioning to a more granular API key management approach. Update related documentation and API specifications to reflect the new structure, including changes to the tenant API key management paths. Adjust frontend code and internationalization files to remove references to the deprecated API key reset functionality, enhancing clarity and consistency across the application.
Revoke existing keys on reset, unify scope enforcement, default empty
scopes to read-only, map API key scopes to tenant roles, and remove dead
key-generation helpers left over from the tenant api_key column removal.
Introduce embed_channels storage, publish-token and session-token auth,
origin allowlist enforcement, shared Redis rate limiter, public embed API
routes, webhooks with SSRF validation, and session listing by embed source.