Commit Graph

97 Commits (014f95f1394a7bfd1c7bbbdcdc19057a80dcaca5)

Author SHA1 Message Date
lyingbug b82fd6c0f9
fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings (#3416)
* fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings

Verified and fixed from the shared-space permission review:

- Embed channels kept knowledge_ids, tag_ids, mentioned_items, skill_names
  and summary_model_id from anonymous visitors. Mentions are only scoped
  for shared agents, so a visitor could query any KB (and pick any model)
  of the channel workspace by ID. The payload now drops them; the widget
  never sends them.
- PUT /knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki/issues/:issue_id/status updated any issue
  by ID. The update is now scoped to the path's KB (404 otherwise).
- A direct org invite let the inviter attach any user of the target
  workspace (or any user by ID) as its representative, whose username and
  email the roster then showed to all members. Direct adds attach no
  representative, and the roster returns emails only for the caller's own
  workspace.
- COS and KS3 dropped the bucket (and COS the region) segment when turning
  a path into an object key, while the tenant check scans every segment:
  cos://42/<region>/prefix/7/... passed as tenant 42 and read tenant 7's
  object from a shared bucket. Both must now match the service's config.
- Shared agent listings returned the full agent to receivers. Prompts and
  the creator's user ID are withheld; capabilities and scope stay visible.
- Temporary document uploads let the caller pick the parser engine (and
  its credentials) of a shared agent's workspace; only the agent's rules
  choose one there now.
- Suggested questions used request / message-snapshot knowledge_ids
  without a permission check. Each document is now resolved to its KB and
  checked like KB IDs, including a shared agent's scope.
- IM channels accepted any knowledge_base_id (and any agent ID on create).
  Both must belong to the channel's workspace, the KB also to a restricted
  API key's allow-list.
- KB-restricted API keys could list org-shared KBs outside their allow-list
  in the organization views; those listings are now filtered.
- With enable_rbac=false, RequireKBAccess let cross-workspace denials
  through. That switch is for roles inside a workspace; the guard now
  always denies another workspace's KB, since handlers behind it load by
  ID without a tenant filter.
- The org member limit was counted before and enforced apart from the
  insert; it is now checked in the insert's transaction with the
  organization row locked (SQLite serializes writers instead).
- The UpdateOrganization route comment and API doc said owner-only; the
  service and UI allow org admins. Comment and doc corrected.

Documented, not changed: issued /r/ and presigned links stay valid until
they expire after a share is revoked.

* fix(security): address review of the low-severity shared-space fixes

- Embed payloads also drop question_origin. It selects a KB like an
  @mention for agents that retrieve only when mentioned, and the widget
  never sends it; the selection stays inside the agent's scope, but an
  anonymous visitor should not pick among its KBs. suggestion_attribution is
  kept (the widget sends it and it is validated).
- The receiver view of a shared agent also withholds the follow-up
  suggestion instruction, a prompt like the others. Starter questions are
  shown to receivers anyway, and the sharer's name is displayed by design.
- Follow-up suggestion generation moves into the agent's workspace with
  types.WithExecutionTenant instead of a bare tenant rewrite, so the
  caller is pinned before the document permission check runs. The auth
  middleware and the shared run already pinned it; this removes the
  dependency on that.
- KS3 CopyFile copies only from the service's own bucket (as COS and S3
  do); another bucket's path is a cross-backend copy.

Tests cover the dropped question_origin, the follow-up instruction and the
/shared-agents listing, a follow-up context with the tenant switched, a
repeated wiki issue status update, and the KS3 copy source.
2026-09-18 22:58:46 +08:00
MercuialC aaec920a9c
feat(audit): 知识库活动记录对 API Key 操作额外显示 Key 名称 (#3405)
* feat(audit): show API key name on knowledge-base activity

API-key operations currently look like the first tenant user or
"system". Snapshot the key id/name into activity details so the
feed can tell which key initiated the change, without restoring
key authorization onto async workers.

Fixes #3402

* fix(frontend): show activity API key on a second line

The 132px actor column truncates "user · API Key · name" into one
ellipsis. Keep the person on the first line and the key name below.

---------

Co-authored-by: MercuialC <MercuialC@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost.localdomain>
2026-09-18 19:39:34 +08:00
lyingbug 76a19f14c4
feat(mcp): add built-in MCP server with per-workspace endpoints (#3371)
* feat(mcp): add built-in MCP server with per-workspace endpoints

WeKnora previously exposed itself to MCP clients only through the Python
package under mcp-server/, which binds one process to one API key and
therefore to one workspace, and mirrors the REST API tool-for-tool.

This adds a native MCP server surface to the Go backend:

- New mcp_endpoints table (PostgreSQL 000100, SQLite 000020). A workspace
  can publish any number of endpoints, each with its own bearer token
  (SHA-256 stored, rotatable, shown once), knowledge-base allowlist, tool
  allowlist, default agent and per-minute rate limit.
- Management API under /api/v1/mcp-endpoints (Viewer reads, Admin writes,
  API keys need manage_channels) plus a tool catalog endpoint.
- internal/mcpserver hosts one mcp-go Streamable HTTP server in stateless
  mode at /mcp/:endpoint_id. tools/list is filtered per endpoint and
  tools/call re-checks the allowlist, applies rate limiting and touches
  last_used_at. MCPEndpointAuth resolves the token and injects the
  workspace, an mcp_endpoint principal and an API-key style scope derived
  from the endpoint, so existing knowledge-base and capability checks
  apply unchanged.
- Redesigned tool set (12 tools in four groups): retrieval and reading
  reuse the agent's native tools; ask runs the default or a named agent
  synchronously and returns a cited answer with a session_id for
  follow-ups; wiki tools cover search, read and index; write tools are
  off by default. Knowledge bases accept ids or names.
- Frontend: new "MCP Server" integrations tab (tab id mcpserver, to
  avoid clashing with the existing MCP-client settings section) with
  endpoint cards, a create/edit drawer, a one-time token dialog and
  ready-to-paste snippets for Cursor/VS Code/Claude Desktop, Claude Code
  and mcp-remote. Locales updated in all five languages.
- Deployment capability integrations.mcpserver wired on both sides.
- Docs: website-docs MCP page now leads with the built-in server; the
  Python mcp-server README carries a deprecation notice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): wire the MCP server into DI/router and tighten authorization

The previous commit lost eight staged files to the repo pre-commit hook,
which resolves ROOT to the main checkout and re-adds the main-checkout
copies of tracked files into the worktree index. This commit restores them
(container providers, RouterParams and route registration, context key,
principal, clone table entry, deployment capability key, SQLite parity
test) and addresses the review findings:

- Knowledge-base scope is authorized, not trusted: endpoint allowlists and
  every tool call resolve each knowledge base through access.ResolveKB for
  the calling principal (ownership or organization share). Foreign IDs are
  rejected on create/update and dropped at call time.
- Write tools mint explicit editor grants via access.KBAccess.WithGrant
  before calling the knowledge service, so add/update/delete go through the
  same RequireKBWrite path as the REST API. add_document also checks the
  grant itself.
- ask no longer accepts agent_id. It runs only the endpoint's configured
  agent; tenant-owned agents and user-facing builtins qualify, internal
  builtins (wiki fixer, skill installer) are refused both on save and at
  call time. Web search is forced off for MCP calls.
- Tool annotations match behaviour: ask is not read-only, add_document is
  a mutation.
- CORS allows MCP-Protocol-Version / Mcp-Session-Id / Last-Event-ID and
  exposes Mcp-Session-Id for browser-based MCP clients.
- Rate limiter runs its local cleanup goroutine; SQLite migration gains the
  deleted_at index for parity with PostgreSQL; non-ASCII endpoint names get
  unique mcpServers keys derived from the endpoint id.
- Swagger annotations on the management handler.
- Tests: KB isolation (service and server), write grants, endpoint-agent
  restriction, tool annotations, and a router test that mounts the public
  /mcp/:endpoint_id surface and checks the deployment capability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(mcp): renumber migrations after rebase onto main

main took 000100 / 000020 for chunks_index_diet, so the mcp_endpoints
migrations move to 000101 (PostgreSQL) and 000021 (SQLite); the SQLite
parity test and docs follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): run document tools under the knowledge base owner tenant

Shared knowledge bases resolved through access.ResolveKB were only half
usable: documents of an organization-shared knowledge base are stored under
the owner tenant, so the document-level tools that queried by the calling
tenant found nothing, and add_document would have created rows under the
caller's tenant inside someone else's knowledge base.

- knowledgeInScope loads documents tenant-agnostically and then requires
  the document to belong to an allowed knowledge base and to that base's
  tenant.
- scopedKBContext replaces grantContext: it resolves the grant, switches
  the execution tenant to the knowledge base owner (KBAccess.Context) and
  swaps TenantInfo to the owner so storage/model settings resolve there.
  list_documents, read_document and every write tool run under it.
- Locale text and docs no longer claim clients can pass agent_id.
- Go SDK gains MCP endpoint methods (client/mcp_endpoint.go) with docs, and
  the Swagger artifacts are regenerated.
- Tests: shared knowledge base read/write under the owner tenant, spoofed
  document tenant rejected, viewer share cannot write.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(mcp): renumber migrations after rebase onto main

main now carries 000101 / 000021 (knowledge_profiles), so the
mcp_endpoints migrations move to 000102 (PostgreSQL) and 000022 (SQLite);
the SQLite parity test expects version 22 and the docs follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): guard last_used touch without a repository and wrap SDK line

The transport tests build the server without a repository; the background
last_used_at write then dereferenced a nil interface and, on the slower CI
runner, took the test binary down. touchLastUsed now returns early when no
repository is wired, and the tests inject a recording repository and assert
the touch instead. Also wraps a 123-column SDK signature for the client
module's lll check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 22:40:05 +08:00
wizardchen 801ae18f91 fix(embed): enforce host origin allowlists on framed pages 2026-09-14 18:03:57 +08:00
lyingbug 7e53c31671
feat(browser): connect local Chrome with task controls and display modes (#3180)
* feat(browser): integrate BrowserSkill local task tabs and account pairing

* feat(browser): refine task routing, lifecycle, and display modes

* fix(browser): reclaim temporary task tabs and groups

* test(database): cover browser authorization migration schema
2026-09-11 17:59:27 +08:00
nullptr-error 277d6ee851
feat(sandbox): add an interactive terminal and files tab beside chat (#3110)
* feat(sandbox): stream interactive PTYs from Cube and E2B

Give session sandboxes a provider-neutral terminal capability so a later
WebSocket layer can attach without knowing Cube vs E2B. Long-lived
streams use a timeout-free client; idle terminals keep the sandbox alive
by refreshing TTL, and a workspace can set how long to wait before
disconnect.

* feat(session): bridge browser terminals to the session sandbox

Mint a short-lived ticket over a normal authenticated POST so the browser
WebSocket never puts the access JWT in the query string. After upgrade,
recheck the bound token, membership, and session ownership so logout or
revocation tears the PTY down. Provisioning stays opt-in: a GET
handshake only creates a sandbox when the client sends provision=1.

* feat(chat): add a sandbox terminal panel beside the conversation

Open a side panel with an xterm attached to the session sandbox. Starting
the terminal is an explicit click so merely opening the panel does not
create or resume a microVM; reconnects stay lookup-only until the user
confirms create-and-start. Persist the remote shell PID in
sessionStorage so a refresh reattaches instead of spawning an orphan.

* feat(sandbox): let workspaces set terminal idle disconnect

Expose the idle-disconnect duration in the sandbox config editor so an
operator can close unused terminals and let the provider TTL pause the
sandbox, instead of leaving PTYs open for the built-in 15 minutes.

* feat(chat): show generated files in the sandbox side panel

Move the per-message artifact list into the first tab of the right-hand panel so generated files stay in view with the terminal. Keep the old drawer only for embedded chat.

* fix(sandbox-terminal): keep tickets out of logs and live PTYs across refresh

Gin was copying the handshake JWT into response_body logs, silent access-token
rotation dropped open terminals as AUTH_REVOKED, and first-use provisioning
missed shared agents. Local echo now skips password prompts.

---------

Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
2026-09-08 17:43:15 +08:00
lyingbug 3d81b977f1
refactor(resource-access): unify scoped authorization and transfer recovery (#3097)
* refactor(resource-access): unify scoped authorization and transfer recovery

* fix(resource-access): close reparse and transfer review gaps

* fix: enforce explicit file bindings and recover move cleanup

* fix: align mutation admission and cleanup scope checks
2026-09-08 15:36:33 +08:00
leon4z 988cbb0330
fix(models): show usage details when deletion is blocked (#2975)
* fix(models): show usage details when deletion is blocked

* fix(models): open the matching agent section and cap usage lists

Agent "open configuration" now lands on the tab that owns the binding
(VLM/ASR vs follow-ups), and delete failures keep the server message when
structured details cannot be parsed. Listed KB/agent rows are capped at 50
while totals still drive the deletion guard and dialog headings.

---------

Co-authored-by: Leon <leon_hfut@foxmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
2026-09-02 17:20:37 +08:00
lyingbug 01ec6c0509
ui(sandbox): rename settings to skill sandbox and fix skill install (#2792)
* ui(sandbox): rename settings to code sandbox and simplify cards

"Sandbox backend" leaked implementation jargon into the settings nav.
Call the page what users configure — an isolated runtime for skill
scripts — and only surface incomplete-config warnings on the cards.

* fix(sandbox): type the card overflow menu options

vue-tsc rejected pushing a themed delete item onto an untyped options
array; name the option shape so the menu still marks delete as danger.

* fix(sandbox): keep the editor wizard moving into skills

Saving on the runtime step used to close the drawer when editing, so
step 4 was only reachable from the rail. Continue after save, move
full verification off the runtime form, and stop treating "using the
base template" as the empty value for every image field.

* fix(sandbox): store skill bundles on the workspace default backend

Skill install passed a stub tenant with no default storage, so saving
the zip failed with empty provider and the 500 hid the real cause.

* ui(sandbox): regroup skill install and rename to skill sandbox

Show install vs installed groups, fold long descriptions in the list,
and call the settings surface a skill sandbox.

* ui(sandbox): show skill install transcript in a compact popup

Keep the card from growing; the run opens beside the history button
with a capped height and its own scroll.

* ui(sandbox): show installed skills on config cards

Cube/E2B tiles now list skill names so the list reads as skill sandboxes; a click opens the editor on the skills step.

* ui(sandbox): show finished skill installs as static history

A completed run already has durable messages; replaying the event log would animate the whole install again. Hide chat answer actions in this transcript.

* style(frontend): enhance compact skill timeline display with improved font sizes

Updated the CSS for the compact skill timeline to adjust font sizes for various elements, ensuring better readability in the popup interface. This includes specific adjustments for embedded agent streams and markdown content.

* ui(sandbox): refactor header structure in SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer

Updated the header structure in both SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer components to improve layout and organization. Added a new slot for extra header content in SettingDrawer and adjusted CSS for better alignment and spacing in both components.

* ui(sandbox): enhance skill loading feedback and improve deep check logic

Updated the SandboxConfigEditorDrawer to refine the logic for deep checks based on the current step. Enhanced the SkillInstallTimeline component to manage in-flight live loops and provide better feedback for skill loading failures. Adjusted the SandboxSettings view to display error messages for failed skill loads, ensuring users are informed of any issues during the skill installation process.
2026-08-25 13:24:58 +08:00
wizardchen 98239de0d2 refactor(context): replace middleware.EmbedChannelContextKey with types.EmbedChannelContextKey
- Updated test files to use types.EmbedChannelContextKey instead of middleware.EmbedChannelContextKey for consistency.
- Introduced context cloning decisions for EmbedChannelContextKey to ensure proper context management during background tasks.
- Added tests to verify the correct behavior of context key declarations and their cloning decisions.
2026-08-13 18:00:02 +08:00
wizardchen ffcb10f953 feat(memory): add cross-session long-term memory
Persist extracted and explicit memories across sessions with topic
resolution, semantic recall, document affinity, consolidation, workspace
settings, and inbox/interests UI.
2026-08-13 18:00:02 +08:00
sunmh 95ddeae067 feat(auth): add /auth/oidc/start endpoint for direct 302 OIDC login
New endpoint GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/start — unlike /auth/oidc/url which
returns JSON and requires frontend JS to navigate, this endpoint directly
returns a 302 redirect to the OIDC Provider's authorization page. This
enables external platforms (enterprise portals, Nexus, etc.) to give a
single clickable link that triggers the full OIDC authorization code
flow and, when the IdP has an active SSO session, achieves passwordless
login without any frontend involvement.

- backend derives the callback URL from the request origin automatically
  (no caller-supplied redirect_uri needed)
- OIDC nonce cookie is bound identically to /auth/oidc/url (CSRF/replay
  protection)
- registered in the auth middleware public-path whitelist (otherwise
  the global auth middleware returns 401 before routing reaches the
  handler)
- refactored shared nonce-cookie helper out of GetOIDCAuthorizationURL
  for reuse by OIDCStart
2026-08-11 15:41:48 +08:00
wizardchen cc846d8e29 fix: harden shared agent source selector validation
Reject invalid agent_source_tenant_id instead of silently falling back, fix a resolveAgent nil panic when a shared selector fails, and add regression tests for wiki write-tool filtering and agent resolution.
2026-07-30 12:28:23 +08:00
wizardchen ab9f705843 fix: harden shared agent source permissions 2026-07-30 12:28:23 +08:00
wizardchen a55b09ea82 refactor(auth): unify session-context attachment and split the Auth middleware
The five near-identical "c.Set + context.WithValue" blocks (JWT branch,
tenantless branch, both API-key attach helpers, EmbedAuth) now go through
one applyAuthSession helper, so the c.Keys surface and the request-context
surface can no longer drift apart. The 140-line JWT branch inside Auth is
split into authenticateJWTUser / resolveTargetTenant, which also removes a
duplicate GetTenantByID roundtrip on the X-Tenant-ID switch path.

Fixes folded in:
- delete GetTenantIDFromContext: it read ctx.Value("tenantID") while the
  value is stored under types.TenantIDContextKey ("TenantID"), so it could
  never succeed (dead, broken, uncalled)
- isPlatformTenantOptionalAPI: match "/api/v1/system/admin" exactly or as
  a "/"-delimited prefix instead of a bare HasPrefix that would also admit
  sibling paths sharing the prefix
- 401 for a presented-but-invalid Bearer token now says "invalid or
  expired token" instead of the misleading "missing authentication"
- replace the remaining log.Printf calls in the auth path with the
  request-scoped structured logger

New tests lock the both-surfaces invariant of applyAuthSession, the
tenantless "no tenant/role keys" contract, and bearerToken parsing.
2026-07-27 11:25:23 +08:00
wizardchen 8ae82573ab fix(mcp): coordinate OAuth token refresh and authorization polling
Prevent concurrent refresh-token rotation across instances, distinguish
expired-but-refreshable tokens from active authorization, and bind OAuth
popup polling to a per-attempt ID so stale tokens cannot satisfy new consent.
2026-07-23 15:35:24 +08:00
wizardchen 23db592c4a feat(api-keys): add platform-scoped API keys for control-plane automation
Introduce platform API keys with capability-based access to tenant management,
system settings, runtime queues, and audit logs, plus admin UI for key lifecycle
and system audit log viewing.
2026-07-21 17:21:35 +08:00
wizardchen d1cab68e3d fix(api-keys): allow scoped file serve and ingest batch routes
Let tenant-wide retrieve keys serve tenant-bounded /files paths while
denying KB-restricted keys, declare knowledge batch write routes for
ingest-capable keys, and short-circuit ownership checks for API-key
principals already authorized by the gate and KB allow-list.
2026-07-20 19:52:13 +08:00
wizardchen 380e371c2e refactor: remove Neo4j-based conversation memory feature
Drop the memory pipeline, API fields, settings UI, and embed toggles so chat no longer depends on Neo4j graph storage for episodic recall.
2026-07-18 23:41:48 +08:00
wizardchen 41975abcc5 refactor(terminology): rename user-facing tenant labels to workspace
Align product copy, API docs, Swagger descriptions, and i18n strings
with workspace terminology while keeping internal tenant identifiers
and headers unchanged for API compatibility.
2026-07-14 16:14:43 +08:00
wizardchen e1572b71b9 feat(models): let system admins edit builtin model config
Allow platform system administrators to update builtin model parameters
and credentials from the management UI while keeping secrets masked in API
responses. UI edits clear YAML ownership so startup reconciliation no
longer overwrites runtime overrides.
2026-07-14 15:56:02 +08:00
wizardchen a6c85dad28 feat(middleware): enhance logger to sanitize new and old password fields
Updated the logger to include regex patterns for sanitizing "new_password" and "old_password" fields in JSON logs. Added a corresponding test case to verify the sanitization functionality.
2026-07-13 20:11:00 +08:00
wizardchen 87ba3fc2de refactor(auth): unify OIDC provisioning under shared default_tenant_mode policy
Drop the standalone OIDC_AUTH_DEFAULT_TENANT_MODE / oidc_auth.default_tenant_mode
knob so OIDC auto-provisioning and local password registration share the single
auth.default_tenant_mode policy (resolved by the callback handler). Repair
tenantless sessions by falling back to the first active membership on the login
happy path and stale-preference paths, allow tenantless PUT /auth/me/preferences,
clear the tenant snapshot on /auth/me responses without a tenant, and default the
frontend canCreateTenant capability to fail-closed until /auth/me confirms it.
2026-07-13 19:14:49 +08:00
wizardchen ecf2c1fb9b feat(auth): support tenantless provisioning and gated self-service workspace creation
Allow deployments to register users without auto-creating a personal tenant, expose creation policy via /auth/me, and guide tenantless accounts through a workspace onboarding flow.
2026-07-13 18:13:51 +08:00
wizardchen 50b8c0a72e fix(security): harden agent share listing and align full-access API key routes
Enforce tenant ownership in ListSharesByAgent so full-access API keys cannot enumerate cross-tenant shares, and allow full-access keys to create KBs and manage share routes consistently with other tenant-wide operations.
2026-07-13 17:09:58 +08:00
wizardchen 2c6f082062 Refine scoped API key capabilities 2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen 97c36f634a refactor(api-keys): remove API key reset endpoint and update documentation
Eliminate the POST /tenants/{id}/api-key endpoint for resetting tenant API keys, transitioning to a more granular API key management approach. Update related documentation and API specifications to reflect the new structure, including changes to the tenant API key management paths. Adjust frontend code and internationalization files to remove references to the deprecated API key reset functionality, enhancing clarity and consistency across the application.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen 1d1e1e3d25 refactor(api-keys): update role handling and enhance API key restrictions
Change the default role for tenant API keys from 'admin' to 'owner' to align with the new authorization model. Update related tests to reflect this change, ensuring that API keys with the owner role are correctly denied access to management paths and system-admin routes. Introduce new tests to validate that API keys are properly restricted from accessing sensitive endpoints, reinforcing the security measures in place.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen a6759d61b5 feat(api-keys): implement DenyAPIKeyPrincipal middleware and related tests
Add DenyAPIKeyPrincipal middleware to explicitly block API-key principals from accessing certain routes, ensuring security for endpoints outside the /api/v1 group. Introduce tests to validate that API keys are correctly denied access while allowing JWT sessions to pass through. This enhances the overall authorization model by reinforcing the default-deny approach for API keys.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen d2ffc1b973 refactor(api-keys): simplify authorization to a single-role gate
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a
central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model.

- Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes
  declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared
  routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the
  JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals.
- Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope
  is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that
  unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method.
- Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching.
- Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort
  writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and
  backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans.
- Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename
  role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales.
- Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize
  gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen fedb6c3f7e test(api-keys): add tests for tenant API key management path rejection
Introduce tests to validate that tenant API keys are correctly restricted from accessing management paths. Implemented new test cases for both allowed and forbidden paths, ensuring proper enforcement of API key scopes. Additionally, refactored existing tests to utilize the new rejection logic.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen 9a76a24ce6 refactor(api-keys): use role field and route-level API key guards
Replace scopes JSON with a viewer/contributor/admin role column, move
unsafe-method authorization from path-prefix middleware to declarative
APIKey* guards on routes, and close remaining KB-scope gaps in handlers.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen c65ffa3d9c fix(api-keys): enforce scope from request context after attach
Use c.Request.Context() in authenticateAPIKeyRequest so scoped keys are
actually restricted, update dto tests for removed tenant.api_key, and add
a regression test for the attach-context contract.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen 3f516d7f31 fix(api-keys): harden scoped key auth after code review
Revoke existing keys on reset, unify scope enforcement, default empty
scopes to read-only, map API key scopes to tenant roles, and remove dead
key-generation helpers left over from the tenant api_key column removal.
2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
wizardchen 505bc7ddec feat: add scoped tenant api keys 2026-07-07 12:00:13 +08:00
nullkey 445a4330fa fix(server): case-insensitive doc keyword search + not-found classification
Make document keyword search case-insensitive (LOWER(...) LIKE LOWER(?)) in the
list filter and SearchKnowledge / SearchKnowledgeInScopes paths so a query and
its differently-cased variant return the same results.

Classify not-found consistently as HTTP 404 (not 500) so clients read a
permanent resource.not_found instead of a retryable 5xx: map the document /
chunk not-found sentinels in the KB-access middleware (typed ErrChunkNotFound
via errors.Is), and return 404 for a missing message on the continue-stream and
message-delete endpoints.
2026-07-06 22:53:01 +08:00
wizardchen f23c674bad fix(security): close six open GHSA findings from security triage
Harden share-link listing, password rotation, OIDC callback binding,
org invite search, knowledge batch mutations, and connector redirects.
2026-07-02 15:03:53 +08:00
wizardchen ee1014f87c feat(frontend): add API integration playground 2026-07-01 11:14:51 +08:00
wizardchen 97bca74a31 fix: harden API principal config after review
Add require_direct_header toggle, external user ID validation, JWT TTL
limits, SaveToken error handling, ru-RU i18n, API docs, and Go SDK methods.
2026-06-30 20:01:05 +08:00
wizardchen cb99736d72 feat: scope API MCP OAuth by principal 2026-06-30 20:01:05 +08:00
wizardchen 7f3f219f58 feat(mcp): add OAuth2 authorization for MCP services
Support connecting to MCP servers that require OAuth2, with a Cursor-like
zero-config flow: the user provides only a URL and the system performs
metadata discovery, dynamic client registration (DCR), and the
authorization code flow with PKCE on first connect.

- Persist per-user access/refresh tokens and per-service DCR client
  credentials, encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- Store the PKCE verifier/state during the flow via Redis with an
  in-memory fallback for Lite mode
- Cache MCP clients per (service, user) so tokens stay user-isolated
- Add endpoints for authorize-url, callback, status, and token revoke;
  the callback is allowlisted for unauthenticated access
- Surface a structured "authorization required" hint when a tool call
  hits an unauthorized MCP service
- Frontend: add an auth-type selector with OAuth config, inline
  authorization status/actions, and render the connection test result
  inline in the editor drawer instead of a stacked centered dialog
2026-06-22 20:19:31 +08:00
langcaiye 0c3d45d3cd fix: mark knowledge delete failures after retry exhaustion 2026-06-16 16:47:46 +08:00
wizardchen ed9802ff2b feat(embed): add backend embed channels with auth and rate limiting (#1657)
Introduce embed_channels storage, publish-token and session-token auth,
origin allowlist enforcement, shared Redis rate limiter, public embed API
routes, webhooks with SSRF validation, and session listing by embed source.
2026-06-12 23:10:39 +08:00
langcaiye a0786b6fe7 fix(wiki): clear stale citation chunks on deletion 2026-06-12 23:08:20 +08:00
wizardchen 1778c5ac7b refactor(tracing): remove Jaeger integration and related components
This commit removes Jaeger tracing support from the project, including the associated Docker configurations, Go modules, and middleware. The changes simplify the codebase by eliminating unused tracing functionality, which was previously integrated for observability. Documentation and scripts have also been updated to reflect the removal of Jaeger references.
2026-06-08 21:01:04 +08:00
wizardchen b820e690f0 fix(auth): allow anonymous access to share-link endpoints (#1617)
The global Auth middleware allowlist (noAuthAPI) was missing the
share-link routes, so an unauthenticated invitee opening /register?token=
hit a 401 on /auth/invitations/lookup and the frontend bounced them to
/login instead of showing the register page. Add both share-link
endpoints to the allowlist and stop the request interceptor from treating
their 401s as a session-expiry redirect.

Refs: https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/issues/1617
2026-06-05 18:51:32 +08:00
wizardchen 3ae3ea97c5 fix(knowledge): prevent documents from getting stuck in "processing"
Several failure modes left Knowledge.parse_status pinned at "processing"
forever, with no signal to users beyond a permanent spinner. This commit
addresses the root causes and adds a safety net.

- Asynq worker pool: explicit Concurrency (default 16, env-tunable via
  WEKNORA_ASYNQ_CONCURRENCY) so batch uploads don't queue behind a
  CPU-count-sized worker pool. Redis op timeouts raised to 500ms/1000ms
  (WEKNORA_REDIS_OP_TIMEOUT_MS) to absorb bursty multimodal counter ops.

- DocReader RPC: cap each call with WEKNORA_DOCREADER_CALL_TIMEOUT
  (default 30m). Without this, a hung docreader pinned a worker for the
  full DocumentProcessTimeout window.

- ImageMultimodal: finalize-on-last-attempt semantics. A permanently
  failing single image no longer strands the parent — the asynq retry
  is allowed to run, but on the final attempt we count the image
  regardless of outcome. Redis DECR errors fall back to enqueuing the
  post-process task instead of returning silently.

- Dead-letter callback: when DocumentProcess / KnowledgePostProcess /
  ManualProcess exhausts retries, immediately mark the corresponding
  Knowledge as failed with the last error. This surfaces the failure
  in the UI without waiting for the housekeeping sweep.

- HousekeepingService: 5-minute cron that flips knowledge rows stuck
  in "processing" past DocumentProcessTimeout + 10m to failed, plus
  summary rows stuck > 1h. Catches anything the other safety nets
  miss (worker SIGKILL mid-handler, etc.). Disable with
  WEKNORA_HOUSEKEEPING_ENABLED=false.

- Distributed startup recovery: previously the post-restart sweep was
  skipped whenever REDIS_ADDR was set, even though Asynq does not
  reschedule the task that was actively running on the dead instance.
  Now the sweep runs in distributed mode too, but only against rows
  older than 30 minutes to avoid racing peer instances.
2026-05-28 15:14:45 +08:00
wizardchen ae4ec0cf06 fix(im): make presigned URL flow diagnosable end-to-end
When IM image rendering breaks, operators previously had no log line to
correlate against the IM platform's fetch attempt. Add observability
hooks on both ends and unblock HEAD probes so common IM previews work
at all.

- log rewriteStorageURLs success/failure/no-op with the full signed URL
  (operators can copy it from logs and verify public reachability)
- log presigned handler 4xx with client_ip + UA + tenant_id + file_path
  so failures correlate against IM platform fetch logs; use the request
  context so trace IDs are preserved
- accept HEAD on /api/v1/files/presigned: IM platforms (Feishu, Slack
  etc.) probe with HEAD before GET when rendering image previews, and a
  401 there is enough to break the inline image even when the GET would
  have succeeded
- add Admin-only GET /api/v1/files/presigned-preview that returns the
  exact URL an IM channel would embed for the calling tenant, for
  self-service verification without sending a real IM message
- clarify APP_EXTERNAL_URL and MINIO_ENDPOINT public-reachability rules
  in .env.example; misconfigured endpoints are the most common cause of
  "image broken in IM" reports
2026-05-28 08:03:57 +08:00
lyingbug 3611a8607d
feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode (#1504)
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode

When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.

This change introduces a share-link model:

- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
  added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
  re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
  Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
  that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
  Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread

Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.

Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.

Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.

* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting

- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
2026-05-27 19:42:01 +08:00
wizardchen 9cce0c8e5e feat(system): consolidate system admin and settings into one Settings panel
Replace the standalone /platform/system/* routes with a single
"系统设置" section inside the canonical Settings modal. The previous
SystemLayout.vue / SystemAdmins.vue surfaces are removed and their
functionality (system admin roster, global settings) is hosted directly
in SystemSettings.vue under the standard `.section-header` /
`.settings-group` skeleton. Legacy URLs redirect to the modal section
so external bookmarks don't 404.

Backend:
- SystemSettingService.Reset + repo.Delete: drop the DB override for a
  key so the 3-tier resolver falls back to ENV / built-in default.
  Idempotent (resetting a never-persisted key returns nil); emits an
  audit row only on real deletions, invalidates the local cache, and
  publishes to peers via the existing pubsub channel.
- TenantService.BulkSetStorageQuota: overwrite every tenant's
  storage_quota in one statement. Powers POST /system/admin/tenants/
  apply-default-storage-quota; bypasses the per-tenant whitelist on
  PUT /tenants/:id which intentionally forbids storage_quota edits.
- AuditAction{SystemAdminPromoted,SystemAdminRevoked} constants and
  emitAdminAudit() in SystemHandler — promote / revoke now leave an
  audit trail with TenantID=0 and {target_email,target_username,
  idempotent|changed} in details.
- SystemSetting.LastModifiedByName: derived per-request display label
  (username, email fallback) so the UI shows "wizardchen" instead of
  a UUID prefix without storing a denormalised column.

Frontend:
- SystemSettings.vue rewritten against the Settings modal skeleton with
  auto-persisting controls (switch/select @change, input/inputnumber
  @blur, tag-input + per-delta popconfirm for SSRF whitelist and admin
  roster). auth.registration_mode change goes through an inline
  popconfirm; cancel rolls back. Reset / bulk-apply also inline
  popconfirms — no dialog modal for these per-row affordances.
- Priority hint panel surfaces the DB > ENV > default resolver order
  so operators can reason about "I set the env but it doesn't show up".
- Router: /platform/system, /platform/system/settings, /platform/system/
  admins are now compatibility redirects to /platform/settings?section=
  system-global.
- Settings modal sized 900x700 → 1080x780 and content-wrapper 600 → 760
  so the wider tables (members, system settings) breathe; <1100px
  viewport still flexes to the screen.
- i18n: system.globalSettings.* keys for title / description / loading /
  empty / badges / priority hint / per-key labels / reset / bulkApply /
  admins (label, placeholder, save messages, popconfirm copy) across
  zh-CN, en-US, ko-KR, ru-RU.

Misc:
- internal/utils/filesize.go doc: clarify MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB is a
  deploy-time-only knob (nginx + docreader + frontend each cache the
  env at startup); a SystemAdmin UI override would mislead operators
  because nginx would still 413. Until all four layers can hot-reload
  the limit in lockstep, this stays env-only.
- internal/utils/security.go: SSRF whitelist parser/runtime now drives
  off SystemSettingService for live updates; ENV remains the fallback
  for never-overridden deployments.
2026-05-26 21:13:56 +08:00