* fix(security): close the low-severity shared-space findings
Verified and fixed from the shared-space permission review:
- Embed channels kept knowledge_ids, tag_ids, mentioned_items, skill_names
and summary_model_id from anonymous visitors. Mentions are only scoped
for shared agents, so a visitor could query any KB (and pick any model)
of the channel workspace by ID. The payload now drops them; the widget
never sends them.
- PUT /knowledgebase/:kb_id/wiki/issues/:issue_id/status updated any issue
by ID. The update is now scoped to the path's KB (404 otherwise).
- A direct org invite let the inviter attach any user of the target
workspace (or any user by ID) as its representative, whose username and
email the roster then showed to all members. Direct adds attach no
representative, and the roster returns emails only for the caller's own
workspace.
- COS and KS3 dropped the bucket (and COS the region) segment when turning
a path into an object key, while the tenant check scans every segment:
cos://42/<region>/prefix/7/... passed as tenant 42 and read tenant 7's
object from a shared bucket. Both must now match the service's config.
- Shared agent listings returned the full agent to receivers. Prompts and
the creator's user ID are withheld; capabilities and scope stay visible.
- Temporary document uploads let the caller pick the parser engine (and
its credentials) of a shared agent's workspace; only the agent's rules
choose one there now.
- Suggested questions used request / message-snapshot knowledge_ids
without a permission check. Each document is now resolved to its KB and
checked like KB IDs, including a shared agent's scope.
- IM channels accepted any knowledge_base_id (and any agent ID on create).
Both must belong to the channel's workspace, the KB also to a restricted
API key's allow-list.
- KB-restricted API keys could list org-shared KBs outside their allow-list
in the organization views; those listings are now filtered.
- With enable_rbac=false, RequireKBAccess let cross-workspace denials
through. That switch is for roles inside a workspace; the guard now
always denies another workspace's KB, since handlers behind it load by
ID without a tenant filter.
- The org member limit was counted before and enforced apart from the
insert; it is now checked in the insert's transaction with the
organization row locked (SQLite serializes writers instead).
- The UpdateOrganization route comment and API doc said owner-only; the
service and UI allow org admins. Comment and doc corrected.
Documented, not changed: issued /r/ and presigned links stay valid until
they expire after a share is revoked.
* fix(security): address review of the low-severity shared-space fixes
- Embed payloads also drop question_origin. It selects a KB like an
@mention for agents that retrieve only when mentioned, and the widget
never sends it; the selection stays inside the agent's scope, but an
anonymous visitor should not pick among its KBs. suggestion_attribution is
kept (the widget sends it and it is validated).
- The receiver view of a shared agent also withholds the follow-up
suggestion instruction, a prompt like the others. Starter questions are
shown to receivers anyway, and the sharer's name is displayed by design.
- Follow-up suggestion generation moves into the agent's workspace with
types.WithExecutionTenant instead of a bare tenant rewrite, so the
caller is pinned before the document permission check runs. The auth
middleware and the shared run already pinned it; this removes the
dependency on that.
- KS3 CopyFile copies only from the service's own bucket (as COS and S3
do); another bucket's path is a cross-backend copy.
Tests cover the dropped question_origin, the follow-up instruction and the
/shared-agents listing, a follow-up context with the tenant switched, a
repeated wiki issue status update, and the KS3 copy source.
* feat(audit): show API key name on knowledge-base activity
API-key operations currently look like the first tenant user or
"system". Snapshot the key id/name into activity details so the
feed can tell which key initiated the change, without restoring
key authorization onto async workers.
Fixes#3402
* fix(frontend): show activity API key on a second line
The 132px actor column truncates "user · API Key · name" into one
ellipsis. Keep the person on the first line and the key name below.
---------
Co-authored-by: MercuialC <MercuialC@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost.localdomain>
* feat(mcp): add built-in MCP server with per-workspace endpoints
WeKnora previously exposed itself to MCP clients only through the Python
package under mcp-server/, which binds one process to one API key and
therefore to one workspace, and mirrors the REST API tool-for-tool.
This adds a native MCP server surface to the Go backend:
- New mcp_endpoints table (PostgreSQL 000100, SQLite 000020). A workspace
can publish any number of endpoints, each with its own bearer token
(SHA-256 stored, rotatable, shown once), knowledge-base allowlist, tool
allowlist, default agent and per-minute rate limit.
- Management API under /api/v1/mcp-endpoints (Viewer reads, Admin writes,
API keys need manage_channels) plus a tool catalog endpoint.
- internal/mcpserver hosts one mcp-go Streamable HTTP server in stateless
mode at /mcp/:endpoint_id. tools/list is filtered per endpoint and
tools/call re-checks the allowlist, applies rate limiting and touches
last_used_at. MCPEndpointAuth resolves the token and injects the
workspace, an mcp_endpoint principal and an API-key style scope derived
from the endpoint, so existing knowledge-base and capability checks
apply unchanged.
- Redesigned tool set (12 tools in four groups): retrieval and reading
reuse the agent's native tools; ask runs the default or a named agent
synchronously and returns a cited answer with a session_id for
follow-ups; wiki tools cover search, read and index; write tools are
off by default. Knowledge bases accept ids or names.
- Frontend: new "MCP Server" integrations tab (tab id mcpserver, to
avoid clashing with the existing MCP-client settings section) with
endpoint cards, a create/edit drawer, a one-time token dialog and
ready-to-paste snippets for Cursor/VS Code/Claude Desktop, Claude Code
and mcp-remote. Locales updated in all five languages.
- Deployment capability integrations.mcpserver wired on both sides.
- Docs: website-docs MCP page now leads with the built-in server; the
Python mcp-server README carries a deprecation notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): wire the MCP server into DI/router and tighten authorization
The previous commit lost eight staged files to the repo pre-commit hook,
which resolves ROOT to the main checkout and re-adds the main-checkout
copies of tracked files into the worktree index. This commit restores them
(container providers, RouterParams and route registration, context key,
principal, clone table entry, deployment capability key, SQLite parity
test) and addresses the review findings:
- Knowledge-base scope is authorized, not trusted: endpoint allowlists and
every tool call resolve each knowledge base through access.ResolveKB for
the calling principal (ownership or organization share). Foreign IDs are
rejected on create/update and dropped at call time.
- Write tools mint explicit editor grants via access.KBAccess.WithGrant
before calling the knowledge service, so add/update/delete go through the
same RequireKBWrite path as the REST API. add_document also checks the
grant itself.
- ask no longer accepts agent_id. It runs only the endpoint's configured
agent; tenant-owned agents and user-facing builtins qualify, internal
builtins (wiki fixer, skill installer) are refused both on save and at
call time. Web search is forced off for MCP calls.
- Tool annotations match behaviour: ask is not read-only, add_document is
a mutation.
- CORS allows MCP-Protocol-Version / Mcp-Session-Id / Last-Event-ID and
exposes Mcp-Session-Id for browser-based MCP clients.
- Rate limiter runs its local cleanup goroutine; SQLite migration gains the
deleted_at index for parity with PostgreSQL; non-ASCII endpoint names get
unique mcpServers keys derived from the endpoint id.
- Swagger annotations on the management handler.
- Tests: KB isolation (service and server), write grants, endpoint-agent
restriction, tool annotations, and a router test that mounts the public
/mcp/:endpoint_id surface and checks the deployment capability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(mcp): renumber migrations after rebase onto main
main took 000100 / 000020 for chunks_index_diet, so the mcp_endpoints
migrations move to 000101 (PostgreSQL) and 000021 (SQLite); the SQLite
parity test and docs follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): run document tools under the knowledge base owner tenant
Shared knowledge bases resolved through access.ResolveKB were only half
usable: documents of an organization-shared knowledge base are stored under
the owner tenant, so the document-level tools that queried by the calling
tenant found nothing, and add_document would have created rows under the
caller's tenant inside someone else's knowledge base.
- knowledgeInScope loads documents tenant-agnostically and then requires
the document to belong to an allowed knowledge base and to that base's
tenant.
- scopedKBContext replaces grantContext: it resolves the grant, switches
the execution tenant to the knowledge base owner (KBAccess.Context) and
swaps TenantInfo to the owner so storage/model settings resolve there.
list_documents, read_document and every write tool run under it.
- Locale text and docs no longer claim clients can pass agent_id.
- Go SDK gains MCP endpoint methods (client/mcp_endpoint.go) with docs, and
the Swagger artifacts are regenerated.
- Tests: shared knowledge base read/write under the owner tenant, spoofed
document tenant rejected, viewer share cannot write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(mcp): renumber migrations after rebase onto main
main now carries 000101 / 000021 (knowledge_profiles), so the
mcp_endpoints migrations move to 000102 (PostgreSQL) and 000022 (SQLite);
the SQLite parity test expects version 22 and the docs follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): guard last_used touch without a repository and wrap SDK line
The transport tests build the server without a repository; the background
last_used_at write then dereferenced a nil interface and, on the slower CI
runner, took the test binary down. touchLastUsed now returns early when no
repository is wired, and the tests inject a recording repository and assert
the touch instead. Also wraps a 123-column SDK signature for the client
module's lll check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): stream interactive PTYs from Cube and E2B
Give session sandboxes a provider-neutral terminal capability so a later
WebSocket layer can attach without knowing Cube vs E2B. Long-lived
streams use a timeout-free client; idle terminals keep the sandbox alive
by refreshing TTL, and a workspace can set how long to wait before
disconnect.
* feat(session): bridge browser terminals to the session sandbox
Mint a short-lived ticket over a normal authenticated POST so the browser
WebSocket never puts the access JWT in the query string. After upgrade,
recheck the bound token, membership, and session ownership so logout or
revocation tears the PTY down. Provisioning stays opt-in: a GET
handshake only creates a sandbox when the client sends provision=1.
* feat(chat): add a sandbox terminal panel beside the conversation
Open a side panel with an xterm attached to the session sandbox. Starting
the terminal is an explicit click so merely opening the panel does not
create or resume a microVM; reconnects stay lookup-only until the user
confirms create-and-start. Persist the remote shell PID in
sessionStorage so a refresh reattaches instead of spawning an orphan.
* feat(sandbox): let workspaces set terminal idle disconnect
Expose the idle-disconnect duration in the sandbox config editor so an
operator can close unused terminals and let the provider TTL pause the
sandbox, instead of leaving PTYs open for the built-in 15 minutes.
* feat(chat): show generated files in the sandbox side panel
Move the per-message artifact list into the first tab of the right-hand panel so generated files stay in view with the terminal. Keep the old drawer only for embedded chat.
* fix(sandbox-terminal): keep tickets out of logs and live PTYs across refresh
Gin was copying the handshake JWT into response_body logs, silent access-token
rotation dropped open terminals as AUTH_REVOKED, and first-use provisioning
missed shared agents. Local echo now skips password prompts.
---------
Co-authored-by: hailongzhao <hailongzhao@tencent.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
* refactor(resource-access): unify scoped authorization and transfer recovery
* fix(resource-access): close reparse and transfer review gaps
* fix: enforce explicit file bindings and recover move cleanup
* fix: align mutation admission and cleanup scope checks
* fix(models): show usage details when deletion is blocked
* fix(models): open the matching agent section and cap usage lists
Agent "open configuration" now lands on the tab that owns the binding
(VLM/ASR vs follow-ups), and delete failures keep the server message when
structured details cannot be parsed. Listed KB/agent rows are capped at 50
while totals still drive the deletion guard and dialog headings.
---------
Co-authored-by: Leon <leon_hfut@foxmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wizardchen <wizardchen@tencent.com>
* ui(sandbox): rename settings to code sandbox and simplify cards
"Sandbox backend" leaked implementation jargon into the settings nav.
Call the page what users configure — an isolated runtime for skill
scripts — and only surface incomplete-config warnings on the cards.
* fix(sandbox): type the card overflow menu options
vue-tsc rejected pushing a themed delete item onto an untyped options
array; name the option shape so the menu still marks delete as danger.
* fix(sandbox): keep the editor wizard moving into skills
Saving on the runtime step used to close the drawer when editing, so
step 4 was only reachable from the rail. Continue after save, move
full verification off the runtime form, and stop treating "using the
base template" as the empty value for every image field.
* fix(sandbox): store skill bundles on the workspace default backend
Skill install passed a stub tenant with no default storage, so saving
the zip failed with empty provider and the 500 hid the real cause.
* ui(sandbox): regroup skill install and rename to skill sandbox
Show install vs installed groups, fold long descriptions in the list,
and call the settings surface a skill sandbox.
* ui(sandbox): show skill install transcript in a compact popup
Keep the card from growing; the run opens beside the history button
with a capped height and its own scroll.
* ui(sandbox): show installed skills on config cards
Cube/E2B tiles now list skill names so the list reads as skill sandboxes; a click opens the editor on the skills step.
* ui(sandbox): show finished skill installs as static history
A completed run already has durable messages; replaying the event log would animate the whole install again. Hide chat answer actions in this transcript.
* style(frontend): enhance compact skill timeline display with improved font sizes
Updated the CSS for the compact skill timeline to adjust font sizes for various elements, ensuring better readability in the popup interface. This includes specific adjustments for embedded agent streams and markdown content.
* ui(sandbox): refactor header structure in SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer
Updated the header structure in both SandboxConfigEditorDrawer and SettingDrawer components to improve layout and organization. Added a new slot for extra header content in SettingDrawer and adjusted CSS for better alignment and spacing in both components.
* ui(sandbox): enhance skill loading feedback and improve deep check logic
Updated the SandboxConfigEditorDrawer to refine the logic for deep checks based on the current step. Enhanced the SkillInstallTimeline component to manage in-flight live loops and provide better feedback for skill loading failures. Adjusted the SandboxSettings view to display error messages for failed skill loads, ensuring users are informed of any issues during the skill installation process.
- Updated test files to use types.EmbedChannelContextKey instead of middleware.EmbedChannelContextKey for consistency.
- Introduced context cloning decisions for EmbedChannelContextKey to ensure proper context management during background tasks.
- Added tests to verify the correct behavior of context key declarations and their cloning decisions.
Persist extracted and explicit memories across sessions with topic
resolution, semantic recall, document affinity, consolidation, workspace
settings, and inbox/interests UI.
New endpoint GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/start — unlike /auth/oidc/url which
returns JSON and requires frontend JS to navigate, this endpoint directly
returns a 302 redirect to the OIDC Provider's authorization page. This
enables external platforms (enterprise portals, Nexus, etc.) to give a
single clickable link that triggers the full OIDC authorization code
flow and, when the IdP has an active SSO session, achieves passwordless
login without any frontend involvement.
- backend derives the callback URL from the request origin automatically
(no caller-supplied redirect_uri needed)
- OIDC nonce cookie is bound identically to /auth/oidc/url (CSRF/replay
protection)
- registered in the auth middleware public-path whitelist (otherwise
the global auth middleware returns 401 before routing reaches the
handler)
- refactored shared nonce-cookie helper out of GetOIDCAuthorizationURL
for reuse by OIDCStart
Reject invalid agent_source_tenant_id instead of silently falling back, fix a resolveAgent nil panic when a shared selector fails, and add regression tests for wiki write-tool filtering and agent resolution.
The five near-identical "c.Set + context.WithValue" blocks (JWT branch,
tenantless branch, both API-key attach helpers, EmbedAuth) now go through
one applyAuthSession helper, so the c.Keys surface and the request-context
surface can no longer drift apart. The 140-line JWT branch inside Auth is
split into authenticateJWTUser / resolveTargetTenant, which also removes a
duplicate GetTenantByID roundtrip on the X-Tenant-ID switch path.
Fixes folded in:
- delete GetTenantIDFromContext: it read ctx.Value("tenantID") while the
value is stored under types.TenantIDContextKey ("TenantID"), so it could
never succeed (dead, broken, uncalled)
- isPlatformTenantOptionalAPI: match "/api/v1/system/admin" exactly or as
a "/"-delimited prefix instead of a bare HasPrefix that would also admit
sibling paths sharing the prefix
- 401 for a presented-but-invalid Bearer token now says "invalid or
expired token" instead of the misleading "missing authentication"
- replace the remaining log.Printf calls in the auth path with the
request-scoped structured logger
New tests lock the both-surfaces invariant of applyAuthSession, the
tenantless "no tenant/role keys" contract, and bearerToken parsing.
Prevent concurrent refresh-token rotation across instances, distinguish
expired-but-refreshable tokens from active authorization, and bind OAuth
popup polling to a per-attempt ID so stale tokens cannot satisfy new consent.
Introduce platform API keys with capability-based access to tenant management,
system settings, runtime queues, and audit logs, plus admin UI for key lifecycle
and system audit log viewing.
Let tenant-wide retrieve keys serve tenant-bounded /files paths while
denying KB-restricted keys, declare knowledge batch write routes for
ingest-capable keys, and short-circuit ownership checks for API-key
principals already authorized by the gate and KB allow-list.
Align product copy, API docs, Swagger descriptions, and i18n strings
with workspace terminology while keeping internal tenant identifiers
and headers unchanged for API compatibility.
Allow platform system administrators to update builtin model parameters
and credentials from the management UI while keeping secrets masked in API
responses. UI edits clear YAML ownership so startup reconciliation no
longer overwrites runtime overrides.
Updated the logger to include regex patterns for sanitizing "new_password" and "old_password" fields in JSON logs. Added a corresponding test case to verify the sanitization functionality.
Drop the standalone OIDC_AUTH_DEFAULT_TENANT_MODE / oidc_auth.default_tenant_mode
knob so OIDC auto-provisioning and local password registration share the single
auth.default_tenant_mode policy (resolved by the callback handler). Repair
tenantless sessions by falling back to the first active membership on the login
happy path and stale-preference paths, allow tenantless PUT /auth/me/preferences,
clear the tenant snapshot on /auth/me responses without a tenant, and default the
frontend canCreateTenant capability to fail-closed until /auth/me confirms it.
Allow deployments to register users without auto-creating a personal tenant, expose creation policy via /auth/me, and guide tenantless accounts through a workspace onboarding flow.
Enforce tenant ownership in ListSharesByAgent so full-access API keys cannot enumerate cross-tenant shares, and allow full-access keys to create KBs and manage share routes consistently with other tenant-wide operations.
Eliminate the POST /tenants/{id}/api-key endpoint for resetting tenant API keys, transitioning to a more granular API key management approach. Update related documentation and API specifications to reflect the new structure, including changes to the tenant API key management paths. Adjust frontend code and internationalization files to remove references to the deprecated API key reset functionality, enhancing clarity and consistency across the application.
Change the default role for tenant API keys from 'admin' to 'owner' to align with the new authorization model. Update related tests to reflect this change, ensuring that API keys with the owner role are correctly denied access to management paths and system-admin routes. Introduce new tests to validate that API keys are properly restricted from accessing sensitive endpoints, reinforcing the security measures in place.
Add DenyAPIKeyPrincipal middleware to explicitly block API-key principals from accessing certain routes, ensuring security for endpoints outside the /api/v1 group. Introduce tests to validate that API keys are correctly denied access while allowing JWT sessions to pass through. This enhances the overall authorization model by reinforcing the default-deny approach for API keys.
Redesign tenant API key authorization around one dimension (role) plus a
central default-deny gate, replacing the previous role + KB-scoped flag model.
- Add APIKeyGate as the single authority for API-key authorization: routes
declare one policy (MinRole) via apiKeyGroup/apiKeyRoute helpers; undeclared
routes are denied by default. JWT principals short-circuit the gate and the
JWT-centric RBAC guards short-circuit for API-key principals.
- Roles: viewer/contributor/admin are knowledge-base data-plane only (KB scope
is a pure downstream data filter); owner is a full-access tenant tier that
unlocks tenant-level infrastructure routes and is required for every method.
- Drop the KBScoped policy flag and the KB-restricted-vs-tenant branching.
- Security hardening: never disclose HMAC secret (return presence only), abort
writes on API-key encryption failure, deny KB-restricted keys on /files, and
backfill legacy key hashes at startup instead of O(N) plaintext scans.
- Frontend: two-level create dialog (access type -> permission level), rename
role labels to reflect actual scope, sync en/zh/ko/ru locales.
- Fix startup self-check false-positive on trailing-slash routes and normalize
gin paths before comparison; add regression tests.
Introduce tests to validate that tenant API keys are correctly restricted from accessing management paths. Implemented new test cases for both allowed and forbidden paths, ensuring proper enforcement of API key scopes. Additionally, refactored existing tests to utilize the new rejection logic.
Replace scopes JSON with a viewer/contributor/admin role column, move
unsafe-method authorization from path-prefix middleware to declarative
APIKey* guards on routes, and close remaining KB-scope gaps in handlers.
Use c.Request.Context() in authenticateAPIKeyRequest so scoped keys are
actually restricted, update dto tests for removed tenant.api_key, and add
a regression test for the attach-context contract.
Revoke existing keys on reset, unify scope enforcement, default empty
scopes to read-only, map API key scopes to tenant roles, and remove dead
key-generation helpers left over from the tenant api_key column removal.
Make document keyword search case-insensitive (LOWER(...) LIKE LOWER(?)) in the
list filter and SearchKnowledge / SearchKnowledgeInScopes paths so a query and
its differently-cased variant return the same results.
Classify not-found consistently as HTTP 404 (not 500) so clients read a
permanent resource.not_found instead of a retryable 5xx: map the document /
chunk not-found sentinels in the KB-access middleware (typed ErrChunkNotFound
via errors.Is), and return 404 for a missing message on the continue-stream and
message-delete endpoints.
Support connecting to MCP servers that require OAuth2, with a Cursor-like
zero-config flow: the user provides only a URL and the system performs
metadata discovery, dynamic client registration (DCR), and the
authorization code flow with PKCE on first connect.
- Persist per-user access/refresh tokens and per-service DCR client
credentials, encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM)
- Store the PKCE verifier/state during the flow via Redis with an
in-memory fallback for Lite mode
- Cache MCP clients per (service, user) so tokens stay user-isolated
- Add endpoints for authorize-url, callback, status, and token revoke;
the callback is allowlisted for unauthenticated access
- Surface a structured "authorization required" hint when a tool call
hits an unauthorized MCP service
- Frontend: add an auth-type selector with OAuth config, inline
authorization status/actions, and render the connection test result
inline in the editor drawer instead of a stacked centered dialog
Introduce embed_channels storage, publish-token and session-token auth,
origin allowlist enforcement, shared Redis rate limiter, public embed API
routes, webhooks with SSRF validation, and session listing by embed source.
This commit removes Jaeger tracing support from the project, including the associated Docker configurations, Go modules, and middleware. The changes simplify the codebase by eliminating unused tracing functionality, which was previously integrated for observability. Documentation and scripts have also been updated to reflect the removal of Jaeger references.
The global Auth middleware allowlist (noAuthAPI) was missing the
share-link routes, so an unauthenticated invitee opening /register?token=
hit a 401 on /auth/invitations/lookup and the frontend bounced them to
/login instead of showing the register page. Add both share-link
endpoints to the allowlist and stop the request interceptor from treating
their 401s as a session-expiry redirect.
Refs: https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/issues/1617
Several failure modes left Knowledge.parse_status pinned at "processing"
forever, with no signal to users beyond a permanent spinner. This commit
addresses the root causes and adds a safety net.
- Asynq worker pool: explicit Concurrency (default 16, env-tunable via
WEKNORA_ASYNQ_CONCURRENCY) so batch uploads don't queue behind a
CPU-count-sized worker pool. Redis op timeouts raised to 500ms/1000ms
(WEKNORA_REDIS_OP_TIMEOUT_MS) to absorb bursty multimodal counter ops.
- DocReader RPC: cap each call with WEKNORA_DOCREADER_CALL_TIMEOUT
(default 30m). Without this, a hung docreader pinned a worker for the
full DocumentProcessTimeout window.
- ImageMultimodal: finalize-on-last-attempt semantics. A permanently
failing single image no longer strands the parent — the asynq retry
is allowed to run, but on the final attempt we count the image
regardless of outcome. Redis DECR errors fall back to enqueuing the
post-process task instead of returning silently.
- Dead-letter callback: when DocumentProcess / KnowledgePostProcess /
ManualProcess exhausts retries, immediately mark the corresponding
Knowledge as failed with the last error. This surfaces the failure
in the UI without waiting for the housekeeping sweep.
- HousekeepingService: 5-minute cron that flips knowledge rows stuck
in "processing" past DocumentProcessTimeout + 10m to failed, plus
summary rows stuck > 1h. Catches anything the other safety nets
miss (worker SIGKILL mid-handler, etc.). Disable with
WEKNORA_HOUSEKEEPING_ENABLED=false.
- Distributed startup recovery: previously the post-restart sweep was
skipped whenever REDIS_ADDR was set, even though Asynq does not
reschedule the task that was actively running on the dead instance.
Now the sweep runs in distributed mode too, but only against rows
older than 30 minutes to avoid racing peer instances.
When IM image rendering breaks, operators previously had no log line to
correlate against the IM platform's fetch attempt. Add observability
hooks on both ends and unblock HEAD probes so common IM previews work
at all.
- log rewriteStorageURLs success/failure/no-op with the full signed URL
(operators can copy it from logs and verify public reachability)
- log presigned handler 4xx with client_ip + UA + tenant_id + file_path
so failures correlate against IM platform fetch logs; use the request
context so trace IDs are preserved
- accept HEAD on /api/v1/files/presigned: IM platforms (Feishu, Slack
etc.) probe with HEAD before GET when rendering image previews, and a
401 there is enough to break the inline image even when the GET would
have succeeded
- add Admin-only GET /api/v1/files/presigned-preview that returns the
exact URL an IM channel would embed for the calling tenant, for
self-service verification without sending a real IM message
- clarify APP_EXTERNAL_URL and MINIO_ENDPOINT public-reachability rules
in .env.example; misconfigured endpoints are the most common cause of
"image broken in IM" reports
* feat(rbac): add multi-use share-link invitations for invite_only mode
When the auth.registration_mode toggle flips to invite_only, the public
/auth/register endpoint returns 403 — but until now there was no
channel for unregistered users to actually join a tenant. The existing
invitation table required a registered invitee, so new emails could
not enter the system at all.
This change introduces a share-link model:
- Owner generates a multi-use registration link with a per-tenant role
- Recipient opens the link, registers with their own email, and is
added to the tenant on the same request
- Token is stored in plaintext (not hashed) so the management UI can
re-display the URL on demand without a "copy now or revoke" trap.
Threat model is bounded by 7-day TTL, revocability, and the fact
that all the link grants is membership in one tenant.
- accepted_count tracks how many users joined through the link so the
Owner can tell whether a link is fresh or has already been spread
Per-user invitations (registered email -> in-app inbox accept) are
unchanged. Share-link rows use empty invitee_user_id as discriminator;
the partial unique index on (tenant_id, invitee_user_id) was relaxed
to skip empty values so multiple share links can coexist per tenant.
Frontend reuses Login.vue for /register?token=xxx instead of a
parallel page, and adds icon-only revoke / remove actions plus a
distinct "active" status tag for share-link rows.
Migration 000054 adds the token column, the accepted_count column,
and the relaxed pending unique index in a single step.
* feat(auth): update invitation token handling and add rate limiting
- Refactor the invitation token retrieval to use POST instead of GET, enhancing security by preventing the plaintext token from appearing in logs and browser history.
- Update the API endpoint from `/auth/invitations/:token` to `/auth/invitations/lookup` to reflect the new method.
- Introduce a rate limiter for unauthenticated share-link endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks and abuse, ensuring a maximum of 30 requests per minute per IP.
- Adjust the registration flow to maintain user experience while securing the invitation process.
Replace the standalone /platform/system/* routes with a single
"系统设置" section inside the canonical Settings modal. The previous
SystemLayout.vue / SystemAdmins.vue surfaces are removed and their
functionality (system admin roster, global settings) is hosted directly
in SystemSettings.vue under the standard `.section-header` /
`.settings-group` skeleton. Legacy URLs redirect to the modal section
so external bookmarks don't 404.
Backend:
- SystemSettingService.Reset + repo.Delete: drop the DB override for a
key so the 3-tier resolver falls back to ENV / built-in default.
Idempotent (resetting a never-persisted key returns nil); emits an
audit row only on real deletions, invalidates the local cache, and
publishes to peers via the existing pubsub channel.
- TenantService.BulkSetStorageQuota: overwrite every tenant's
storage_quota in one statement. Powers POST /system/admin/tenants/
apply-default-storage-quota; bypasses the per-tenant whitelist on
PUT /tenants/:id which intentionally forbids storage_quota edits.
- AuditAction{SystemAdminPromoted,SystemAdminRevoked} constants and
emitAdminAudit() in SystemHandler — promote / revoke now leave an
audit trail with TenantID=0 and {target_email,target_username,
idempotent|changed} in details.
- SystemSetting.LastModifiedByName: derived per-request display label
(username, email fallback) so the UI shows "wizardchen" instead of
a UUID prefix without storing a denormalised column.
Frontend:
- SystemSettings.vue rewritten against the Settings modal skeleton with
auto-persisting controls (switch/select @change, input/inputnumber
@blur, tag-input + per-delta popconfirm for SSRF whitelist and admin
roster). auth.registration_mode change goes through an inline
popconfirm; cancel rolls back. Reset / bulk-apply also inline
popconfirms — no dialog modal for these per-row affordances.
- Priority hint panel surfaces the DB > ENV > default resolver order
so operators can reason about "I set the env but it doesn't show up".
- Router: /platform/system, /platform/system/settings, /platform/system/
admins are now compatibility redirects to /platform/settings?section=
system-global.
- Settings modal sized 900x700 → 1080x780 and content-wrapper 600 → 760
so the wider tables (members, system settings) breathe; <1100px
viewport still flexes to the screen.
- i18n: system.globalSettings.* keys for title / description / loading /
empty / badges / priority hint / per-key labels / reset / bulkApply /
admins (label, placeholder, save messages, popconfirm copy) across
zh-CN, en-US, ko-KR, ru-RU.
Misc:
- internal/utils/filesize.go doc: clarify MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB is a
deploy-time-only knob (nginx + docreader + frontend each cache the
env at startup); a SystemAdmin UI override would mislead operators
because nginx would still 413. Until all four layers can hot-reload
the limit in lockstep, this stays env-only.
- internal/utils/security.go: SSRF whitelist parser/runtime now drives
off SystemSettingService for live updates; ENV remains the fallback
for never-overridden deployments.