fix(im/wecom): accept custom wss long-connection endpoints behind SSRF host checks

validateEndpointURL pinned the scheme to wss for long-connection endpoints
and then passed the URL to ValidateURLForSSRF, whose scheme allowlist only
accepts http/https — so every custom ws/wss endpoint failed with
"invalid scheme: wss (only http/https allowed)" and SSRF_WHITELIST could
not help because the whitelist is only consulted after the scheme check.
The default endpoint worked only because it short-circuits validation.

Validate ws/wss endpoints under an https mask instead: the scheme is
already pinned, and every host-level guard (restricted hostnames,
private/metadata IPs, DNS rebinding, port blocklist, whitelist and
whitelist-only mode) still applies unchanged. Same approach as
qqbot.validateGatewayURL.
main
LuckVd 2026-10-09 10:26:21 +08:00 committed by lyingbug
parent 1a21af1b82
commit d9237166cc
2 changed files with 84 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
package wecom
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
secutils "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/utils"
)
// setWhitelistForTest swaps the SSRF whitelist singleton for the duration of
// the test, following the pattern in internal/utils/security_test.go.
func setWhitelistForTest(t *testing.T, entries string) {
t.Helper()
secutils.ResetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
os.Setenv("SSRF_WHITELIST", entries)
t.Cleanup(func() {
os.Unsetenv("SSRF_WHITELIST")
secutils.ResetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
})
}
// A custom wss:// endpoint whose host is on the SSRF whitelist must be
// accepted. Before the https-mask validation every custom ws/wss endpoint
// failed with "invalid scheme: wss (only http/https allowed)" (#4047).
func TestValidateEndpointURLAcceptsWhitelistedCustomWssEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
setWhitelistForTest(t, "im.example.com")
err := validateEndpointURL("wss://im.example.com/im_open/longconn", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("whitelisted custom wss endpoint should be accepted, got: %v", err)
}
}
// The scheme pin is untouched: an https:// URL is still rejected where a wss
// endpoint is required, and vice versa.
func TestValidateEndpointURLSchemePinUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
if err := validateEndpointURL("https://im.example.com", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "wss://") {
t.Fatalf("https endpoint must be rejected for a wss slot, got: %v", err)
}
if err := validateEndpointURL("wss://api.example.com", defaultAPIBaseURL, "https"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "https://") {
t.Fatalf("wss endpoint must be rejected for an https slot, got: %v", err)
}
}
// The https mask must not weaken host-level guards: private-IP endpoints stay
// blocked.
func TestValidateEndpointURLStillBlocksPrivateIPWssEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
setWhitelistForTest(t, "")
err := validateEndpointURL("wss://192.168.1.10/ws", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("private-IP wss endpoint must stay blocked")
}
}
// The default endpoint keeps its short-circuit (no validation, no DNS).
func TestValidateEndpointURLDefaultWSEndpointShortCircuits(t *testing.T) {
if err := validateEndpointURL(defaultWSEndpoint, defaultWSEndpoint, "wss"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("default endpoint should short-circuit, got: %v", err)
}
}
// The https path (API base URL) keeps its original behavior end to end.
func TestValidateEndpointURLHttpsPathUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
setWhitelistForTest(t, "api.example.com")
if err := validateEndpointURL("https://api.example.com", defaultAPIBaseURL, "https"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("whitelisted https base URL should keep working, got: %v", err)
}
}

View File

@ -74,7 +74,19 @@ func validateEndpointURL(endpoint, defaultEndpoint, requiredScheme string) error
if u.Scheme != requiredScheme {
return fmt.Errorf("endpoint must use %s:// scheme, got %s://", requiredScheme, u.Scheme)
}
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
// ValidateURLForSSRF only accepts http/https, which made every custom
// ws/wss endpoint fail with "invalid scheme: wss". Validate WebSocket
// endpoints under an https mask instead: the scheme itself was already
// pinned above, and every host-level guard (restricted hostnames,
// private/metadata IPs, DNS rebinding, port blocklist, SSRF_WHITELIST)
// still applies unchanged. Same approach as qqbot.validateGatewayURL.
ssrfTarget := endpoint
if u.Scheme == "ws" || u.Scheme == "wss" {
masked := *u
masked.Scheme = "https"
ssrfTarget = masked.String()
}
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(ssrfTarget); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w (for private deployments on internal networks, add the hostname to SSRF_WHITELIST)", err)
}
return nil