fix(im/wecom): accept custom wss long-connection endpoints behind SSRF host checks
validateEndpointURL pinned the scheme to wss for long-connection endpoints and then passed the URL to ValidateURLForSSRF, whose scheme allowlist only accepts http/https — so every custom ws/wss endpoint failed with "invalid scheme: wss (only http/https allowed)" and SSRF_WHITELIST could not help because the whitelist is only consulted after the scheme check. The default endpoint worked only because it short-circuits validation. Validate ws/wss endpoints under an https mask instead: the scheme is already pinned, and every host-level guard (restricted hostnames, private/metadata IPs, DNS rebinding, port blocklist, whitelist and whitelist-only mode) still applies unchanged. Same approach as qqbot.validateGatewayURL.main
parent
1a21af1b82
commit
d9237166cc
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
|||
package wecom
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
secutils "github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/internal/utils"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// setWhitelistForTest swaps the SSRF whitelist singleton for the duration of
|
||||
// the test, following the pattern in internal/utils/security_test.go.
|
||||
func setWhitelistForTest(t *testing.T, entries string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
secutils.ResetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
|
||||
os.Setenv("SSRF_WHITELIST", entries)
|
||||
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
||||
os.Unsetenv("SSRF_WHITELIST")
|
||||
secutils.ResetSSRFWhitelistForTest()
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A custom wss:// endpoint whose host is on the SSRF whitelist must be
|
||||
// accepted. Before the https-mask validation every custom ws/wss endpoint
|
||||
// failed with "invalid scheme: wss (only http/https allowed)" (#4047).
|
||||
func TestValidateEndpointURLAcceptsWhitelistedCustomWssEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
setWhitelistForTest(t, "im.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
err := validateEndpointURL("wss://im.example.com/im_open/longconn", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss")
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("whitelisted custom wss endpoint should be accepted, got: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The scheme pin is untouched: an https:// URL is still rejected where a wss
|
||||
// endpoint is required, and vice versa.
|
||||
func TestValidateEndpointURLSchemePinUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if err := validateEndpointURL("https://im.example.com", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "wss://") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("https endpoint must be rejected for a wss slot, got: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := validateEndpointURL("wss://api.example.com", defaultAPIBaseURL, "https"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "https://") {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("wss endpoint must be rejected for an https slot, got: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The https mask must not weaken host-level guards: private-IP endpoints stay
|
||||
// blocked.
|
||||
func TestValidateEndpointURLStillBlocksPrivateIPWssEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
setWhitelistForTest(t, "")
|
||||
|
||||
err := validateEndpointURL("wss://192.168.1.10/ws", defaultWSEndpoint, "wss")
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("private-IP wss endpoint must stay blocked")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The default endpoint keeps its short-circuit (no validation, no DNS).
|
||||
func TestValidateEndpointURLDefaultWSEndpointShortCircuits(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if err := validateEndpointURL(defaultWSEndpoint, defaultWSEndpoint, "wss"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("default endpoint should short-circuit, got: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The https path (API base URL) keeps its original behavior end to end.
|
||||
func TestValidateEndpointURLHttpsPathUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
setWhitelistForTest(t, "api.example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
if err := validateEndpointURL("https://api.example.com", defaultAPIBaseURL, "https"); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("whitelisted https base URL should keep working, got: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -74,7 +74,19 @@ func validateEndpointURL(endpoint, defaultEndpoint, requiredScheme string) error
|
|||
if u.Scheme != requiredScheme {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("endpoint must use %s:// scheme, got %s://", requiredScheme, u.Scheme)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(endpoint); err != nil {
|
||||
// ValidateURLForSSRF only accepts http/https, which made every custom
|
||||
// ws/wss endpoint fail with "invalid scheme: wss". Validate WebSocket
|
||||
// endpoints under an https mask instead: the scheme itself was already
|
||||
// pinned above, and every host-level guard (restricted hostnames,
|
||||
// private/metadata IPs, DNS rebinding, port blocklist, SSRF_WHITELIST)
|
||||
// still applies unchanged. Same approach as qqbot.validateGatewayURL.
|
||||
ssrfTarget := endpoint
|
||||
if u.Scheme == "ws" || u.Scheme == "wss" {
|
||||
masked := *u
|
||||
masked.Scheme = "https"
|
||||
ssrfTarget = masked.String()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := secutils.ValidateURLForSSRF(ssrfTarget); err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w (for private deployments on internal networks, add the hostname to SSRF_WHITELIST)", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue